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ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade China has downplayed its hard power, instead focusing on a 
strategy to build its “soft power”. Emerging from a shell of defensive diplomacy dating 
back decades, China suddenly has engaged the world, wooing friends with a subtle, softer 
approach to make gains as America’s popularity has plummeted. In Africa, newly 
popular China is winning oil and gas deals; in Latin America, China is signing strategic 
partnerships, in the Philippines, Chinese films are making inroads against American 
movies, and in southern Thailand the U.S. consulate building in Songkhla is now the 
Chinese consulate. Clearly this charm offensive utilizing soft power has potentially 
forced the United States into a situation in which another country’s appeal outstrips its 
own. As China’s soft power encompasses a global reach, U.S. policymakers need to 
understand how China exerts soft power, whether China’s soft power is dangerous to 
developing nations, and whether elements of China’s charm offensive seek hard power 
objectives which could threaten U.S. interests.   
As America faces a decline in its soft power, it will have to reverse course 
through the promotion of classic American values, public diplomacy, and a great culture 
to prevent the worst-case scenario, China using its soft power to push countries to choose 
between close ties to Washington or closer ties to Beijing. In the meantime, Washington 
must not foolishly ignore the gains China is making in the balance of soft power around 
the world, and seek to properly balance its soft and hard power, a sign of a country’s 
maturity and confidence, which China still struggles with.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Over the past decade China has downplayed its hard power, instead focusing on a 
strategy to build its “soft power”.1 Emerging from a shell of defensive diplomacy dating 
back decades, China suddenly has engaged the world, wooing friends with a subtle, softer 
approach to make gains as America’s popularity has plummeted. In Africa, newly 
popular China is winning oil and gas deals; in Latin America, China is signing strategic 
partnerships, in the Philippines, Chinese films are making inroads against American 
movies, and in southern Thailand the U.S. consulate building in Songkhla is now the 
Chinese consulate.2 Clearly this charm offensive utilizing soft power has potentially 
forced the United States into a situation in which another country’s appeal outstrips its 
own. As China’s soft power encompasses a global reach, U.S. policymakers need to 
understand how China exerts soft power, whether China’s soft power is dangerous to 
developing nations, and whether elements of China’s charm offensive seek hard power 
objectives which could threaten U.S. interests.3  Recognizing China’s increasing 
influence America’s strategy needs to counter Beijing’s charm offensive. Despite the fact 
that soft power is inherently difficult to define and measure, which complicates the 
precise American response, Washington must set clear objectives for itself  throughout 
developing regions of the world, wherever China is employing its charm offensive.    
China’s exertion of influence includes the recent increase of soft power 
expansion, which is the ability to influence by persuasion and example rather than 
coercion. For instance, Beijing’s joining of multilateral institutions, supporting 
peacekeeping operations, powering economic growth in Latin America and Africa, 
developing nations with emerging markets, and fighting narcotics and human trafficking 
all reflect its growing soft power strategy. Yet, China’s growing power also exports its 
                                                 
1 Joseph S. Nye Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004). 
2 Joshua Kurlantzick. Charm Offensive, How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007),  ix. 
3 Joshua Kurlantzick. “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power” Washington, D.C., 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (June 2006): 1. 
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domestic problems. Chinese companies’ poor labor and environmental records and 
opaque governance practices arrive in Latin America and Africa along with Chinese 
investment. These aspects of China’s soft power could prove to be disastrous for 
developing nations. China’s model may not be best suited for democratization, for 
anticorruption initiatives, and for good governance. In addition, most importantly China’s 
soft power could have a significant impact on American interests. If Beijing discovers 
that its interests do not overlap with America’s, its soft power has enabled China to force 
countries to decide between Washington and Beijing. China’s benign image has made 
other countries feel more comfortable establishing closer ties to Beijing and nations in 
Asia, Latin America, and Africa are using Beijing as a hedge against America’s soft 
power. In places where America’s soft power has declined, one finds that China has 
stepped in to find willing partners. In a worst-case scenario, China’s wielding of soft 
power will incrementally push Japan, Taiwan, and even the United States out of regional 
power positions.  
Taiwan provides an example of this scenario. As one of the charm offensive’s 
goals, Beijing seeks to isolate Taiwan politically. In Latin America, for instance, some 
countries have formally recognized Beijing and renounced Taipei in order to benefit their 
economies. Though Taiwan retains nearly half of its formal allies in Latin America, 
China’s economic growth, aid, investment, and increasing attractiveness swayed 
Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominica, Grenada, and Guatemala to recognize to 
Beijing all within the last ten years.4 China also earned the status of an observer at the 
Organization of American States, which is consistently denied to Taiwan. Should 
Panama, one of the last remaining nations to recognize Taiwan switch recognition caused 
by aid, education, and investment provided by Beijing, the remaining Central American 
nations would likely follow, strengthening Beijing’s position in the Latin American.  
Nevertheless, regardless of the quality of China’s growing soft power in its 
current stage Washington needs to critically observe Beijing’s intentions. Its growing 
influence may push nations to make a more explicit choice between external powers’ 
                                                 
4 Kurlantzick. Charm Offensive, 142.  
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alliances. A reformed American foreign policy is needed to adjust to China’s growing 
charm offensive to include an understanding of the growth of Beijing’s soft power, a 
reassessment the United States’ own soft power, and learning from the Chinese through 
their style of public and foreign diplomacy.5 If it is clear that China’s influence 
undermines the development of emerging markets and developing nations’ 
democratization and good governance, the United States must expose Beijing’s links to 
autocratic governments and convince China that support for authoritarianism imperils 
their interest in long-term regional and global stability. Despite the difficulty in defining 
and measuring the soft power of a country, it is clear that China’s appeal and attraction to 
developing nations and emerging markets has increased in recent years. The United 
States’ response should include paying attention to China’s soft power as well as to the 
reasons for America’s decline of soft power.  
The first step in determining the reach of Chinese soft power is defining soft 
power. Joseph Nye, who coined the term in Bound to Lead offers, “It is the ability to get 
what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the 
attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”6 However, his 
definition became simply misunderstood as merely the influence of Coca-Cola, 
Hollywood, blue jeans, and money. Another way to describe soft power is to determine 
what it is not. Soft power is not hard power, such as military and economic might, which 
may be used to persuade others. Hard power can rest on inducement (carrots) or coercion 
(sticks), but soft power seeks to persuade through the power of attraction. Additionally, 
soft power is not necessarily the same as influence. Soft power is the ability to attract, 
which may lead to acquiescence and indirectly lead to influence. According to Nye, 
“Simply put, in behavioral terms soft power is attractive power.”7  
Hard power and soft power differ in ways outcomes are obtained. Commands, 
threats, sanctions, inducements, restrictions are all aspects of hard power which generally 
intend to make a state act in a manner it would not normally desire. However, if a sense 
                                                 
5 Kurlantzick. Charm Offensive, 5. 
6 Nye. Soft Power, x. 
7 Nye. Soft Power, 6. 
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of attraction, appeal, and contribution determine behavior then soft power is at work. 
Similarly, soft power does not use the currency of force or money, but an attraction of 
shared values and the contribution to achieving and enforcing those values. Furthermore, 
soft power tends to be associated with the ability to shape what others want through 
attractiveness whereas hard power is similar to command power, the ability to change 
what others do via coercion or inducement. The differences between hard and soft power 
are important, but the importance of soft power is greater. A state wants to obtain its 
objectives in world politics because other countries admire its values, emulate its 
example, aspire to its level of prosperity, and simply want to follow it. It is this sense that 
attracts other states not by force and threats or sanctions, but by co-opting nations.8  
Nye suggests that in the case of China, soft power attraction has strongly assisted 
Beijing’s hard power objectives. While this is the case for America as well it is an 
indication of China’s development into a great power. “In a global information age, soft 
sources of power such as culture, political values, and diplomacy are part of what makes 
a great power.”9 To complement the original definition offered by Joseph Nye, Elizabeth 
Economy cited in a recent Council on Foreign Relations article offers her views, “People 
often conflate soft power with investment and economic development, but I define it as 
culture, education, and diplomacy.”10  
Recently Joshua Kurlantzick published Charm Offensive offering a different 
perspective on soft power. “In the context of China, both the Chinese government and 
many nations influenced by China enunciate a broader idea of soft power than did Nye. 
For the Chinese, soft power means anything outside of the military and security realm, 
including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive 
economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral 
organizations that are Nye’s carrots and sticks.”11 Further, Kurlantzick explains that soft 
                                                 
8 Nye. Soft Power, 5-8. 
9 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “The Rise of China’s Soft Power” The Asian Wall Street Journal, 29 December 2005. 
10 Esther Pan. “China’s Soft Power Initiative” Washington D.C., Council On Foreign Relations (May 
2006). 
11 Kurlantzick. Charm Offensive, 6. 
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power has two audiences. The elites are recipients of high soft power, whereas the 
general public is targeted with a lower level of soft power, suggesting Beijing’s aid and 
investment may be attractive for authoritarian regimes aiming to stay in power, while soft 
power aimed at gaining the general public’s support may be attractive to democracies. 
For the purpose of this thesis, soft power will expand upon Kurlantzick’s definition to 
include aid and investment provided by the state as an aspect of a nation’s public 
diplomacy and policies. Such an approach capture’s Nye’s original definition, 
incorporates Kurlantzick’s additions, and ensures all potentially attractive aspects of a 
state are explored.  
Beyond the definition of soft power, among scholars there appears to be a limited 
divergence in how Chinese soft power is expressed. Within our working definition of soft 
power, there is general consensus that China is steadily increasing its support for cultural 
and education exchanges. For example, the number of foreign students in China has 
tripled to 110,000 from 36,000 over the past decade, and foreign tourists have also 
increased dramatically to 17 million last year.12 In 2005, China’s education ministry 
announced a new initiative to increase Chinese-language teaching in American 
universities and language institutes around the world. Beijing University began 
sponsoring a visiting-scholar fund to encourage foreign PhDs to study in China. “A 
decade ago, no Chinese university could support such a program,” according to Elizabeth 
Economy.13 In addition to increasing its traditional culture and educational exchanges, 
the Chinese public diplomacy also has seen adjustments in the past decade. By joining 
the World Trade Organization, contributing to United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
assisting with nonproliferation issues, settling territorial disputes with its neighbors, and 
joining a variety of regional organizations, China has made it clear that its new public 
diplomacy combined with “China’s peaceful rise” slogan are to ease fears of its 
intentions.14  
                                                 
12 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “The Rise of China’s Soft Power” The Asian Wall Street Journal, 29 December 
2005.  
13  Elizabeth Economy cited in Esther Pan. “China’s Soft Power Initiative” Council on Foreign 
Relations (May 2006).  
14 Nye. Soft Power, 88. 
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China’s soft power reach extends to Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and 
Southeast Asia. Chinese influence may be portrayed as benign in Latin America. 
However, its two objectives in the region, those of resource gathering and convincing 
nations to renounce their recognition of Taiwan are clearly hard power related. In Africa, 
China is criticized for supporting authoritarian regimes and therefore, advocating human 
rights violations as in the case of Sudan. Yet, China has trained more than 100,000 
Africans in Chinese universities and military institutes, sent 900 doctors to work across 
Africa, and Chinese entities are making major investments in African infrastructure.15 
While at this juncture one may be overstating China’s soft power because its 
aggressive commercial policies may also precipitate anti-Chinese sentiment, as seen in 
the case of Nigeria and Pakistan, it is something that requires attention as it is part of a 
larger power strategy.16 Further, China’s resource grab in the Middle East, Central Asia, 
and Southeast Asia points that most of China’s influence is still security related. China is 
able to win its influence because it can pose a threat, militarily, economically, or 
politically to many countries. Polls and surveys throughout the world indicate a rise in 
China’s soft power and attraction, but while its culture and some public diplomacy tools 
are successful, its values and domestic policies have a limited appeal. The Communist 
Party fears intellectual freedom and resists outside influences. The government has a 
reputation of corruption and is known for poor labor and environmental standards that 
may breed discontent around the world as these issues are exported through China’s 
government-sponsored international initiatives.17 
In comparing China’s soft power potential to that of the United States, there is a 
decline in American soft power in recent years, as indicated by polls conducted by the 
BBC, but U.S. culture still retains worldwide domination. The authoritarian nature of 
China simply cannot overcome the desire for political freedom and individual liberties. 
However, while Washington and European soft power efforts focus currently on 
                                                 
15 Esther Pan. “China’s Soft Power Initiative” Council On Foreign Relations (May 2006). 
16 Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein. “Hoping for the Best, Preparing for the Worst: China’s 
Response to US Hegemony.” The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 29, No.6 (December 2006): 968. 
17 Nye. Soft Power, 89. 
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democracy and good governance, the Chinese have designed their charm offensive to 
produce tangible results in their trade and energy deals, thus producing a sharp rise in 
Chinese alliances. Nevertheless, China is far from equaling America’s soft power, but it 
would be unwise to ignore the gains China has made and there are perhaps a few tools 
they wield that Washington can learn from. 
As a response to the Chinese soft power strategy, there is a great deal Washington 
can do to bolster American soft power globally. To learn exactly how Chinese soft power 
is exerted Kurlantzick suggests more American government missions in China. He  
suggests that the U.S. take a page from “its Cold War policy…at least one person in each 
embassy who studied what the Soviets were doing on the ground in that country; today 
the United States should have one person in each embassy examining that nation’s 
bilateral relations with China.”18 Furthermore, the creation of a public diplomacy czar 
would reconsider cuts in core public diplomacy tools like Voice of America, American 
Centers offering library facilities, and cultural programming in foreign countries. Nye 
reinforces this by arguing that America’s diplomats need to understand the rest of the 
world better, emphasizing improved language and culture skills. Promoting America’s 
participation in multilateral organizations and its core values, a free and rights-oriented 
political society to resonate with the people of the world will inevitably allow American 
soft power to go unchallenged.  
Important questions such as: how is Chinese soft power expressed, what is China 
trying to achieve through its charm offensive, how is Chinese soft power evident in 
Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, what is the impact of the 
charm offensive, what are the limits of Chinese soft power, how does the strength of 
China’s soft power compare to that of America’s, will be explored. Further, this thesis 
will illustrate how Washington currently views China’s soft power, and explain China’s 
charm offensive in the global information age in an attempt to fill the gap in the  
 
 
                                                 
18 Kurlantzick. Charm Offensive,  235. 
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knowledge about China’s soft power and increasingly sophisticated diplomacy, which 
will transform international relations in the coming years for the United States in 
developing regions of the world such as Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  
 
 9
II. CHINESE LEADERSHIP CHANGES 
A. THE CHINESE CENTURY  
As Mao Zedong established the People Republic of China on October 1, 1949, he 
decided not only to create a revolutionary communist society but also to “give active 
support to the national independence and liberation movements in countries in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America.”19 Prior to this announcement on November 15th 1956, China 
attended the Bandung Conference, a meeting of nascent governments of African and 
Asian nations in 1955, “promoting itself as a leader within the developing world, a 
strategy Beijing is reasserting today.”20 In the past decade China has downplayed its hard 
power, instead focusing on a strategy to emerge from a shell of defensive diplomacy, 
engaged the world, wooing friends with a subtle, softer approach to make gains as 
America’s popularity has plummeted, and become the leader of developing nations 
around the world and establish the China Century.  
Nearly three decades of economic growth has changed China enormously. 
China’s trade with other nations grew eight times faster than overall world trade, enabling 
China to build trade surpluses of more than $100 billion annually. Perhaps China’s most 
impressive economic accomplishments are the amassing of the large currency reserves 
and the lifting of 200 million people out of poverty since 1989. Currently, China receives 
more foreign direct investment than other Asian country, it received more than $60 
billion in 2005. Lastly, estimates indicate that by 2025, China will be the world’s second-
largest economy, and if measured using purchasing power parity, it already is.21 These 
internal changes form the foundations for China to exert soft power around the world. 
Specifically, China consists of economic diversity, nationalism, a middle class who is  
 
                                                 
19 Mao Zedong, Opening Address at the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 
1956. 
20 Kurlantzick. Charm Offensive, 13. 
21 Charles W. McMillon. “U.S.-China Trade Data and Analyses: Purchasing Power Parity.” 
Washington D.C., U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2005. 
 10
increasingly knowledgeable and educated, and most importantly a more sophisticated 
leadership who recognizes the need for public diplomacy to protect its vital national 
interests.  
The Chinese economic growth encourages the growth of many other sectors. For 
example, the growth of its academic system produces a more knowledgeable middle class 
and the expansion of the travel industry along with access to internet news portals allows 
the Chinese to discover the world. In 1995, 4.5 million Chinese tourists traveled to 
foreign countries. In 2005, this figure grew to over 30 million increasing Chinese 
knowledge of the world and is a testament to the momentum of a growing economy. As a 
consequence, American educated Chinese are returning to China for greater economic 
opportunities in a modern developing and promising economy.22  
The state forges a greater sense of nationalism through powerful growth, 
technological changes, and academic progress constantly highlighted within state-
dominated media. Projects such as the Chinese space program are utilized to rally public 
opinion around the government, and Beijing has launched mass rallies and rewrote 
textbooks to illustrate the rise of China. Often the government reminds the public of past 
foreign power invasions of China and stresses the need for strength to prevent such 
events from occurring again. “Newspapers like the state-controlled Beijing People’s 
Daily and best-selling books touting China’s strength and questioning the ‘cultural 
colonialism’ of Western products in China only reinforce the nationalist mindset.”23 
Disastrous events such as the 1999 accidental targeting of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade and the EP-3 incident further fueled the nationalism in the country. They 
resulted in a call for military retaliation against the United States and boycotts of 
American products in addition to the battering of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. More 
importantly, America was no longer considered a model, but as a competitor and a 
potential enemy.  
                                                 
22 Unattributed. “Outward Bound,” Economist, 22 June 2006, 74.  
23 Kurlantzick. Charm Offensive, 24.  
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China’s sophisticated leadership, which recognizes the need for public diplomacy 
and a proactive foreign policy, grew from China’s eastern provinces which had benefited 
the most from economic reforms, foreign direct investment, and international exchanges. 
In a comprehensive assessment by H. Lyman Miller and Liu Xiaohong of the twenty-four 
officials of the Politburo at the Fifteenth National Congress in September 1997, six had 
served in the Party leadership before 1992, and most were at least ten years younger than 
their predecessors.24 The younger Party leadership has completed undergraduate and 
graduate level education, often in Western nations, and recognizes the importance of 
diplomacy with the United States. Likewise, the younger generation of leadership 
understands the need for an attractive foreign policy to establish relations and address the 
within Africa, Latin American, and Southeast Asia.  
In addition to the rise in education levels of the senior officials, the midlevel 
officials are also increasingly educated. “In 1982 only 20 percent of China’s provincial 
leaders had attended college. In 2002, this number was 98 percent…and those under 54, 
two-thirds hold Masters or PhD degrees.”25 With a growing complexity of the world, the 
more educated leadership is determined to be a great international player. Compared to 
the previous leadership which  kept any criticism of foreign policy silent, these leaders 
increasingly support a network of Chinese think tanks such as the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences in Beijing, the China Reform Forum, and the Central Party School. 
Additionally, the PRC Foreign Ministry created the Bureau of Policy Planning to focus 
on long-range thinking and develop such strategies as the charm offensive.26  
Clearly the combination of a growing economy, nationalism, education, and 
emergence from isolation attracts attention and serves as a model for other developing 
countries. One may argue that today, the Chinese state reflects the objectives of 
Chairman Mao at the Bandung Conference in 1955 by positioning itself as a leader and a 
                                                 
24 H. Lyman Miller and Liu Xiaohong. “The Foreign Policy Outlook of China’s Third Generation 
Elite,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Age of Reform, 1978-2002, ed. David 
Lampton, 123-151 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).  
25 Joshua Cooper Ramo. The Beijing Consensus (London, England: Foreign Policy Center, 2004), 19-
20. 
26 Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel. “China’s New Diplomacy” Foreign Affairs 6 (2003), 22. 
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promoter of the developing nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Rather than 
simply reacting to international affairs, China with itsgrowing economy and cultural 
popularity embraces its position as a rising great power and is creating a global strategy 
founded on a more sophisticated and powerful foreign policy; the charm offensive.  
 13
III. THE CHARM OFFENSIVE  
A. GOALS 
China’s charm offensive includes five global objectives to bolster its soft power 
which will serve as benchmarks indicating success or failure. However, before looking at 
the tools which carry out the objectives it is important to understand the reasoning behind 
the objectives themselves. The first of which is Beijing’s emphasis on stability in the 
region and peace with all countries, especially its neighbors, reflected in its Peaceful 
Rise. With fourteen nations on its border the Peaceful Rise or Peaceful Development of 
China portrays a benign image. According to Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in a 2004 
speech “China’s rise will not come at the cost of any other country, will not stand in the 
way of any other country, nor pose a threat to any other country.”27 The Chinese 
leadership created Peaceful Rise as it realized its hard power remained relatively weak 
regionally and globally, and promoting peace, stability, development, and cooperation 
would serve Beijing well.28  
In peaceful conditions China’s economy is free to continue its growth, reducing 
the need for domestic and international protests. Gained stability provides an opportunity 
for prosperity, providing opportunities for Chinese companies to invest and expand 
overseas. Further opportunity for needed energy resources would be secured through 
development, and cooperation would allow China to build its own national science and 
technological capabilities. Most importantly these occurrences will only stem from a 
China able to portray itself as benign, diminishing fears of China’s future military power 
or concerns of China’s economic growth diverting trade and foreign investment from 
other nations. 
Under the Peaceful Development of China plan, Beijing plans to seek enough 
resources to feed its growing economy; its second goal. China will shortly be the world’s 
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largest consumer of oil, and is currently the major market for copper, iron ore, aluminum, 
platinum, and timber, all requiring more resources and a stable supply source.29 Adding 
to the demand for resources, an estimated 300 million Chinese are expected to migrate 
from the rural population to the urban population by 2020. As an indication of the 
importance of access to and supply of resources, Premier Wen Jiabao in the spring of 
2006 formed an internal government task force focused on the nation’s energy needs 
manned with China’s highest officials.30 China currently does not have a strategic 
petroleum reserve, and its own domestic oil and gas production continues to decline. In 
the long-term China seeks to control the entire process of resource extraction, processing, 
and delivery to China.31  
Further cooperation with developing nations and improved international relations 
would ease China’s third goal: to build a network of allies who share Beijing’s concerns 
regarding external intervention into domestic affairs. Therefore, China is supporting 
authoritarian governments such as Iran, Burma, Sudan, and Zimbabwe to grow the 
network of allies. In addition, Chinese leadership wants to reduce the international 
influence of Taiwan by rewarding countries economically and diplomatically for isolating 
Taiwan which is China’s fourth goal. Further, China wants to persuade the nations 
within Africa and Latin America, those with formal connections to Taiwan, to recognize 
Beijing formally through diplomatic relations and state that Taiwan is an integral part of 
China. 
China’s last and fifth goal is to develop into a great power, equal to that of the 
United States. “Chinese-language journals argue that China must show the globe it has 
arrived as a great power. ‘By the middle of the 21st century China will be among the great 
powers in the world,’ noted Xia Liping, professor at the Shanghai Institute of 
International Studies.”32 As a great power, China may succeed in shifting influence away 
from the United States, in regions of the world where China’s presence is strongest.  
                                                 
29 Unattributed. “China Effect Convulses Commodity Markets” Financial Times, 15 November 2003.  
30 Kurlantzick. Charm Offensive, 40-41. 
31 Peter S. Goodman. “Big Shift in China’s Oil Policy” Washington Post, 13 July 2005.  
32 Kurlantzick. Charm Offensive, 43.  
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B. THE “WIN-WIN” STRATEGY 
Noting America’s decline in soft power, Beijing adopted the charm offensive 
strategy to fill the void of Washington’s recent lack of application of soft power 
throughout the world.33 China’s hard power is clearly not capable of challenging 
America’s hard power in any region of the world. Therefore, the strategy to achieve the 
mentioned five goals is one of public diplomacy and “win-win” relations. The “win-win” 
strategy seeks to a balance between Latin American, African, Asian, and Arab nations 
benefiting from relations with China, just as China benefits from its relations with them. 
President Hu Jintao delivered a major address in 2005 to Asian leaders titled “An Open 
Mind for Win-Win Cooperation” citing “Dialogue and consultation…is an important 
avenue to win-win cooperation…China will only promote peace, stability and 
prosperity.”34 Essentially, he stated that China would establish diplomatic relations with 
all nations, listen to the needs and wants of other nations, and in line with their third goal, 
not interfere or meddle in domestic issues within that nation. The “win-win” strategy 
affords countries the ability to avoid the onerous economic and political changes 
demanded by Washington and its Western allies. Without making demands upon other 
nations’ political, economic, or social issues, China would further its benign image and 
peaceful development. As Premier Wen Jiabao announced, “We believe that people in 
different regions in countries…have their right and ability to handle their own issues.”35  
Beijing has also reversed its disdain for multilateral organizations. China realized 
it needs to take an active participant role in multilateral organizations offering developing 
nations exposure to otherwise traditionally recluse Chinese diplomats. Such exposure in a 
multilateral forum calmed fears of China’s development and assists in portraying 
Beijing’s benign image. As an active member of multilateral organizations such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ability to foster interactions 
between foreign and Chinese officials reduced fears held by developing nations of 
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Beijing and offered more time to gain influence through an appropriate forum.36 By 
working with multilateral organizations, China is able to illustrate its ability to assume 
the role of a major power and international player.  
Reasserting itself as a leader of developing nations as it proclaimed at the 1955 
Bandung Conference, the Chinese Communist Party’s 2002 work report indicated 
“becoming friends and partners with neighbors” of developing nations is a top strategic 
priority. “In 2002, the Chinese government looked at its foreign policy and ranked 
relations with the U.S. first, and then relations with neighboring countries second…two 
years later, China changed the rankings and ranked relations with neighboring countries 
first.”37 This reflects China’s priorities on the developing world.  
Not only does China’s charm strategy indicate a priority on developing nations, 
but it also seeks those whose bilateral relationships with other major powers are failing. 
These nations are often attracted to China’s ability to remain uninvolved in the economic, 
political, and social issues of their country and tend to be fairly autocratic and possess 
significant energy resources. 
C. THE CHINA MODEL 
As China succeeds in displaying their benign nature through the “win-win” 
strategy, it also portrays itself as a potential economic and social model for developing 
nations. Joshua Cooper Ramo refers to this model as the “Beijing Consensus” in contrast 
to the “Washington Consensus” of the 1990’s, which placed an importance on rapid free-
market reforms for economic growth and prosperity. According to Ramo, “Growth comes 
from the state directing development to some degree, avoiding the kind of chaos that 
comes from rapid economic opening, and thus allowing a nation to build its economic 
strength.”38 It is clear through the transformations of China after 1978 and the dual-track  
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37 Presentation by Ruan Zongze, San Francisco, California, Asia Foundation trilateral dialogue on 
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system, that the idea of the Beijing Consensus promotes a model of top-down control of 
development and poverty reduction, while preventing any real political change and 
ensuring economic prosperity.  
With decades of economic success and poverty reduction under its belt, China’s 
anti-liberal model appears to be attractive especially to authoritarian or semi-authoritarian 
nations. Under this model, and just as China has, the regime is able to commit to the 
economic engine as its associated elites remain in power. China has liberalized much of 
its economy, but the Communist Party still remains in power. A final aspect of the “win-
win” strategy is China’s generous offerings to even the smallest of countries. China 
focuses on small nations, providing significant respect, and without notice is able to 
greatly influence the outcomes of any bilateral agreements. Small nations add up and in 
an ensuing game of balancing power and influence; they may decide the outcome.  
Whether it is the listening aspects in public diplomacy of the “win-win” strategy 
or the active participation in multilateral organizations or establishing itself as a model 
for developing nations or supporting nations with failing relationships with other great 
powers or offering the utmost respect to the smallest of nations, China’s charm strategy is 
certain to woo many countries and gain substantial world influence. With a box of 
influence tools afforded to it, China will make serious gains in accomplishing its goals 
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IV. THE CHARM TOOLS 
A. CULTURE AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
China’s global strategy of strengthening its soft power rests on its culture and 
public diplomacy which is the first major component of the charm offensive. While 
China’s economic growth facilitates the exporting of Chinese culture, language, arts, and 
ethnicity, these soft power tools are not dependent upon investment and economic worth. 
Instead China’s cultural promotion is an integral part of their public diplomacy. “Public 
diplomacy, according to one accepted definition, is the cultivation by governments of 
public opinion in other nations; by cultivating this public opinion abroad, states can more 
effectively pursue their national interests.”39 Clearly if a country’s culture is appealing, 
citizens of another country will pressure their government to act in the interests of the 
popular nation; in this case to support the national interests of China.  
China’s Propaganda Department’s title has formally been changed to that of the 
Publicity Department since the end of the Cold War. According to Rumi Aoyama, the 
newly titled department seeks five main objectives, “Publicizing China’s assertions to the 
outside world, forming a desirable image of the state, issuing rebuttals to distorted 
overseas reports about China, improving the international environment surrounding 
China, and exerting influence on the policy decisions of foreign countries.”40 Recall that 
China’s first goal of their charm offensive is to portray a benign image, and to sell the 
idea that China will not be a threat to other nations. China’s Publicity Department’s 
objectives reinforce this statement and are a step in accomplishing the first goal of the 
charm offensive. 
To best spread the Chinese culture, the new public diplomacy has encouraged 
cultural exchanges across the developing world. The Chinese state has begun to host 
events, bringing people of all aspects of an overseas society together to best understand 
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the inner workings of the two countries. Thailand provides an example of this public 
diplomatic strategy. China has illustrated its understanding of Thailand by inviting people 
from different aspects of Thai society to China. People such as artists, academics, and 
businessmen usually return year after year to foster enduring relationships. Certainly, 
China needs to export their culture not simply bring other societies to their homeland. 
Beijing has accomplished this by creating a version of the Peace Corps, known as the 
China Association of Youth Volunteers. What better way to propagate your culture, than 
to send young Chinese on long-term volunteer missions around the world, namely Laos, 
Ethiopia, Burma, and many others to spread the attraction of the Chinese culture.  
Furthermore, China’s relaxation of immigration restrictions has made it easier for 
Chinese to leave the country for business and tourism, promoting the Chinese-culture and 
language by osmosis. As Beijing has relaxed its policies and encouraged outward 
investment, Chinese businesspeople, students, and workers have left en masse. In Sudan, 
the number of registered Chinese has tripled since the late 1990’s to 24,000. The trade 
organization of Chinese labor contractors states that “the number of Chinese workers 
heading abroad is rising by nearly 20 percent per year; some will overstay their visa and 
never come home.”41 The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology found that 
one database of Chinese in Africa showed 137,000 Chinese residents in Africa in 2002, a 
number believed to be out of date and vastly understated. Other sources state that 300,000 
Chinese migrants have found their way to South Africa.42 Other parts of Asia have 
accepted the largest number of Chinese migrants. Thailand alone has 120,000 Chinese 
migrants who entered in 2003.43 These new migrants across  world are changing the 
demographics, and more importantly, increasing China’s influence and exposure to the 
Chinese culture through local markets, businesses, agricultural estates, and every day 
occurrences. 
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Beijing’s relaxation of tourism limits has also allowed more Chinese to 
experience all the world has to offer. According to the World Tourism Organization, 100 
million Chinese will be traveling by 2020, making Chinese the obvious leaders in 
tourism. Just like most Asian tourists, Chinese generally travel in groups and on short 
tours around the world. However, as China increases its wealth this will change and as 
such will have more effects around the world. The effects include spending, impressing 
citizens of host countries with their knowledge, wealth, and sophistication, and seeking 
more luxury items. Whether this means adding Mandarin speaking staff to businesses 
such as Alcatraz has, offering Mandarin as one of the eight available languages within 
their audio tour or understanding that Chinese are beginning to explore the world with the 
same means as Japanese and South Koreans. Nevertheless, the presence of 100 million 
Chinese around the world on an annual basis is sure to bring more awareness to the 
Chinese culture and language.44  
Not only has Beijing sought to relax their immigration and tourism regulations 
and send their refined diplomats across the world to advertise Chinese culture, it is also 
luring foreign students to China. The Ministry of Education has aggressively advertised 
Chinese universities abroad, created new scholarship programs for students from 
developing countries, eased visa policies for students, and increased the salaries of 
Western scholars to teach in China. The Chinese government hands out 2000 
scholarships per year for students to attend Beijing University, and one study found that 
the number of Chinese scholars coming to the mainland rose from seven thousand in 
1999 to thirty-five thousand in 2005.45 The overall effect has significantly upgraded the 
Chinese university system.  
Promoting the Chinese-language and Chinese-culture studies will further 
contribute to the spread of China’s global influence, while enhancing Chinese 
nationalism. The Chinese government’s recent new initiatives to increase the teaching of 
Chinese includes financial support for the first year of 26 Confucius Institutes in 
countries such as Kenya, South Korea, Uzbekistan, and Australia with the additional goal 
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to build 100 Confucius Institutes around the globe within the next five years. Further, 
another plan allows universities which desire more China studies beyond the Confucius 
Institute curriculum may request the Chinese Ministry of Education to provide additional 
resources often including Chinese-language teachers for one and two year rotations.46 
The cultural and diplomat initiatives appear to have been fairly successful in their 
implementation. The study of Chinese-language and Chinese-culture extends beyond 
China’s borders. For instance the Chinese government sends hundreds of instructors to 
Cambodian Phnom Penh’s Chinese schools. The increase in instructors has raised the 
level of education in Cambodia where normally public schools charge more than 
Chinese-language schools. Therefore, Cambodian parents have realized the Chinese-
language schools provide a better education, at a lower cost, with less corruption.47 
Similarly, in Indonesia, Argentina, Kenya, and Thailand, China’s Ministry of Education 
sends large groups of language teachers for one and two year rotations. In Thailand, the 
one thousand Mandarin teachers each year will be trained and educated by the Chinese 
government and offer other Chinese language resources.48 
China also expanded its media internationally. The Chinese source Xinhua was 
upgraded through the expansion of its international coverage and often Western image,  
the People’s Daily newspaper has new overseas editions, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has expanded and made the appeal of CCTV, Chinese state television, more 
sophisticated. Further China Radio International has increased its broadcasting in English 
to 24 hours a day.49 The modernization of the China media system is an effort to spread 
the Chinese culture and perspective in an ever increasing connected world in the 
information age. 
Beyond the more formal cultural exchanges, Beijing seeks to build a grassroots 
network of informal summits, either in China or other developing nations. Through these 
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meeting with opinion leaders, China is able to advertise its role as a potential partner for 
investment, trade, and also as a developmental model of economic and social success. 
Such small summits have been promoted by the Chinese government, making Beijing the 
center for international Chinese-language media and studies associations. Larger informal 
summits have included the China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum, 
attended by nearly one thousand officials from China and the Caribbean, as an informal 
summit. Others include the Boao Forum for Asia and the ASEAN-China Eminent 
Persons Group, both of which have enabled China to further their initial goal of 
portraying itself as a benign growing power, while further expanding the Chinese culture 
through public diplomatic means.50 
Recently, the Chinese government has looked to ethnic Chinese abroad as not 
only sources of investment and technology, but also as a means to further expand China’s 
soft power. Chinese abroad have increased and fostered relations between China and the 
developing world. In 2001, members of Beijing’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office visited 
more than twenty countries, specifically meeting with leaders of ethnic Chinese 
communities, inspiring their return to China as visitors and as local ambassadors within 
their developing nation.51 Often the state implements this strategy by wooing the senior 
members of the ethnic Chinese community. In many cases Beijing deliberately targets the 
senior members of Chinese chambers of commerce to remove pro-Taiwan members and 
establish closer ties to Beijing. Wooing Chinese abroad is in line with the charm 
offensive’s third goal of reducing the influence capability of Taiwan.  
China’s efforts to entice Chinese-born scholars working in the West and Chinese 
scholars appear to be working as well. The Finance Ministry has encouraged Chinese 
universities to use up to 20 percent of their government funding to repatriate Chinese 
scholars from abroad. Students in neighboring nations such as Cambodia who do well in 
China-backed primary schools can often continue their studies in Chinese middle schools 
and beyond. Throughout this effort China has reportedly opened five hundred of its 
primary and middle schools to young foreign Chinese scholars. Similarly in Laos, the 
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Chinese government grants 230 scholarships each year for students to attend Chinese 
universities. Further education incentives have caused a rise in Chinese returning from 
Hong Kong where seven thousand returned in 1999, but thirty five thousand returned in 
2005. Perhaps the most significant indicator in China’s support for continued and higher 
learning standards is the achievement of one of its university MBA programs, named in 
the top twenty-five by the Financial Times ranking of the world’s finest business 
schools.52 
China’s recruitment of ethnic Chinese support abroad is influential, especially in 
Panama. A population of 200,000 ethnic Chinese relies upon Chinese-language schools 
which recognize Taiwan as a sovereign nation. Since Panamanian schools are supported 
by Taiwan to the tune of $200 million annually, China has reached out to the ethnic 
Chinese. Beijing has lured opinion leaders to China for higher education, sent cultural 
entertainment groups to Panama, and holds celebrations in Panama, all in hopes to turn 
the hard objective of isolating Taiwan into a reality.53  
Perhaps the most significant advancement China has made in its culture and 
public diplomacy tools is the time and investment devoted to an international diplomatic 
corps. Within the last fifteen years the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has raised a new 
generation of diplomats who speak better English and local languages, are younger, and 
more aware of the world. Shockingly one study suggests that half of the four thousand 
diplomats are less than thirty-five years old and are well educated in language and 
politics.54 Further, Beijing has sent 110 young Chinese officials to universities across 
Mexico to learn Spanish and gain a better understanding of their culture and way of life 
in order to better train the diplomats in the Western Hemisphere, and specifically Latin 
America. Building a better diplomatic corps has inherently improved the quality of 
relations between Latin America and China, and is fostered by Chinese diplomats who 
are trained and focus in one region for their entire career. For example, Jiang Yuande, 
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China’s ambassador to Brazil who before accepting his position had spent the past thirty 
years in Portuguese-speaking nations, studying the culture, traditions, and 
history of each. Su Jian the ambassador to East Timor also served in four Portuguese-
speaking postings including Angola and Guinea-Bissau before his current assignment.55 
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs often mandates overseas assignments, 
encouraging envoys to focus on one country or region. In such neighboring countries as 
Cambodia or Thailand, Chinese diplomats have usually complete three or four rotations 
establishing extensive contacts in the local businesses, political communities, and 
refining language skills before ever being considered as ambassadors. Further diplomat 
development includes Beijing’s support for its public diplomacy through constant visits 
by senior Chinese officials to developing nations. Philip Saunders found that in 2002 
China’s president and premier spent more than four times as many days abroad as in 
1993 and senior Chinese officials in general have made at least twice as many visits to 
Thailand and Cambodia than any other great power.56 Certainly, China’s proximity to its 
fourteen neighboring nations limits the difficulties of traveling on short notice. However, 
the constant travel by senior cabinet-level officials reaps rewards for Beijing. Sending a 
top level official to even the smallest of summits illustrates Beijing’s respect for 
developing nations and their willingness to simply listen, furthering their image as a 
benign power and a model of social and economic success. 
B. CHINA’S GOVERNMENT-FUNDED PROGRAMS  
China’s government-funded programs within its public diplomacy are intended to 
influence public opinion abroad. Whereas, the United States depends upon bilateral 
funding, USAID, non-government organizations, or not-for-profit organizations to push 
aid, capital, and goods, Beijing controls nearly every aspect of this economic driver  
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within public diplomacy. The appeal of China’s economic model, its trade, investment, 
and aid compliment the soft power culture tools, and act as the second major 
component of the charm offensive.  
In the last ten years, Beijing’s use of aid, trade, investment, and the attractiveness 
of China’s economic model, emphasizing state control, is a very influential aspect of the 
“win-win” strategy. Just as with the cultural aspect of China’s charm offensive, Beijing 
must portray its economic growth as benign and illustrate how the globe will benefit from 
China’s consumer power. Not only does China attract foreign firms to sell to the world’s 
biggest market, but also encourages its labor market, it most abundant resource to be used 
efficiently by foreign firms. China attracts the largest sum of foreign direct investment of 
any nation, more than $500 billion since 1979, and Wal-Mart alone has an inventory of at 
least $18 billion in China.57 As China continues to grow it will consume and produce a 
great portion of other nation’s goods, therefore creating a “win-win” economic model, 
which is central to China’s peaceful rise and development argument. Increased economic 
cooperation with developing nations was promulgated in 2004 as the Chinese 
government organized the internal conference “Economic Diplomacy Toward 
Developing Countries.”58 
Beijing promotes the idea that China during its peaceful rise and development as a 
global power will eventually outwardly invest. A great deal of China’s appeal to the 
developing nations it associates with rests on portraying China’s potential as an investor. 
The Chinese government encourages firms to invest in strategic industries and select 
countries found in China’s economic Five Year Plan for 2001-2005 in which Beijing 
created the “Go Out” or “Go Global” campaign.59 The “Go Out” campaign is an 
important policy of the Chinese government and the backbone of its charm offensive.  
Chinese high level official visits provide enormous trade, investment, and tourism targets 
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that reach out five to ten years. In 2004, President Hu Jintao visited Latin America 
pledging $100 billion of investment in Argentina and Brazil, gaining great media 
attention and bringing hope to a region which has seen a decline in foreign direct 
investment, mainly caused by China’s cheap labor market.  
In Africa, Chinese officials point to the nine hundred Chinese companies 
investing in the region and have created a $5 billion fund to encourage Chinese firms to 
invest in Africa. The Great Wall Motor Company is one of the nine hundred Chinese 
companies investing in Africa. Though it is a state-owned company it has established 
itself as a young car company aggressively investing in Africa. Africa is too poor to be a 
big market for the world’s major automobile brands, but the developing market offers 
benchmarks of the progress Great Wall’s Chery Automobile Company makes toward 
challenging European, Japanese, Korean, and American auto makers. No longer is 
Europe able to easily export its used cars to Africa, when consumers can now buy new 
for less. Great Wall has set up 20 dealerships since the beginning of 2007 in South Africa 
and has entered the emerging market of Senegal, contributing to the 18-fold increase to 
$7.9 million from $434,000 worth of Chinese car exports since 2003. The Senegalese 
government has assisted by prohibiting the import of vehicles over five years old, cutting 
off the supply of truly cheap second-hand cars, setting the example for other African 
countries and improving the market for low-cost new cars. In the meantime, as European 
and American manufacturers consider producing low-cost models, the Africans will 
continue to buy Chinese. Interestingly, the vehicles are very popular though “the 
emissions standards are not particularly high there. The requirement for safety is also not 
high.”60   
In Southeast Asia, China announced to Indonesia that PRC investment could 
triple within five years to $20 billion. The Northrail project, an ambitious undertaking to 
build a railway from Caloocan to Malolos on the central Philippine island of Luzon, is 
also an example of the Chinese government aggressively pushing its aid, capital, and 
goods. After initially signing a contract with a Spanish firm to build Northrail, the 
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Philippine government backed out and agreed to use Chinese-government sponsored 
firms. The Chinese offered their services at a price of $400 million in assistance and an 
additional $500 million. China, through recent years of diplomat visits and cultural 
understanding, knew what local politicians wanted and were able to offer the deal with a 
30 percent up-front payment as enticement.61 Further, when President Hu Jintao and 
Philippine President Arroyo met in 2005, he promised more than $1.6 billion in new 
Chinese investment and aid to Manila. Such an amount of Chinese aid via the Northrail 
project and promised aid placed Beijing in the same league as Japan and the United 
States in economic relations with the Philippines, illustrating how quickly the Chinese 
have developed their tools of business beyond its culture and public diplomacy. Beijing 
has begun to use aid, trade, investment and economic model, growth with state control, to 
engage with other nations.  
As simply an extension of the Chinese government, through government 
controlled banks, top Chinese companies are offered further encouragement through low-
cost loans and subsidies to invest globally. As reported by the consulting group 
Accenture, the Chinese Development Bank provided the Chinese telecommunications 
company Huawei with a $10 billion low-cost loan to assist with international 
objectives.62 The same report also noted that China seeks not to be simply an export-
driven economy, but they also seek to encourage outward investment to build political 
and economic influence around the world. Since many Chinese companies grew out of 
China, they are particularly understanding of the quirks within the emerging markets of 
developing nations, working in a lawless climate, and therefore more suited to invest in 
countries with little rule of law and serve as a leader for developing nations around the 
world.  
Not only does financial encouragement take place at the highest levels of the 
Chinese government, but also at the provincial level. Provincial governments have 
implemented complimentary programs that encourage Chinese companies to invest and 
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expand into neighboring countries such as Laos. The provincial outward investment is 
similar to the national initiative, through soft loans provided by government owned banks 
designed to encourage the companies to invest in neighbors and to promote programs for 
officials in countries like Pakistan on how to attract Chinese investment. Further, outward 
investment gains momentum through the collaboration of Chinese business delegations 
accompanying Chinese leadership to meet with developing nations, affording the 
business leaders to execute deals immediately and without the interruption of Chinese 
legislation. Such an outward investment strategy clearly has a dual purpose of forging 
China’s political and social capital and soft power around the world.    
In particular, Beijing strongly encourages Chinese companies in the energy 
industry to invest abroad. The encouragement for energy industries to invest abroad is 
driven to satisfy the second goal of the charm offensive: to secure enough resources to 
feed China’s growing economy. The energy companies more so than other sectors, 
remain state dominated and therefore have a significant degree of Chinese government 
oversight from the National Development and Reform Commission.63 Within the past 
five years, Chinese firms operated by the government have bought an estimated $15 
billion of oil and gas deposits and associated industries, usually paying above market 
price. In Venezuela, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has established a 
cooperation agreement with Petroleos de Venezuela, investing nearly $2 billion. In Peru, 
the CNPC has bought a power determining majority of Pluspetrol. In Sudan, Chinese 
firms have invested nearly $4 billion. In Nigeria, the Chinese state-owned CNOOC 
purchased $2.3 billion in oil and gas fields found in the Niger Delta. In Iran the story is 
the same, and continues in Central Asia as in 2005 CNPC purchased PetroKazakhstan,  
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one of the largest oil companies in the region.64 Clearly, these efforts to build a strategic 
reserve are to ensure the Chinese economy is afforded the ability to continue to grow 
uninterrupted.  
Just as Beijing encourages certain industries, it also encourages investment in 
strategic countries, such as those on China’s borders and in regions with ample resources. 
Its economic Five Year Plan for 2001-2005 focuses on three strategic areas of the 
developing world: Latin America, North Africa, and Central Asia, all of which contain 
ample oil and gas to quench the thirst of the Chinese economy. Beijing additionally, 
pushes Chinese firms to invest in its neighbors such as Cambodia, Burma, Laos, 
Thailand, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Vietnam, and even Russia. Fittingly, China is the largest 
source of aid and investment into Cambodia, Burma, Laos, Russia, and Kazakhstan. 
Investment in China’s neighboring countries is part of the “string of pearls” strategy that 
calls for infrastructure along the oil-shipment sea lanes from China’s coast to the Middle 
East. The “string” includes the Chinese financed seaport under construction in Gwadar, 
Pakistan, and increased diplomatic and commercial ties with Bangladesh, Burma, 
Cambodia, Thailand, and islands in the South China Sea.65 In 2005, China’s outward 
investment rose nearly 1,000 percent and at this pace China will be the largest investor in 
developing nations within the next ten years, reflecting Beijing’s new good neighbor 
policy and eagerness to be the leader of the developing world.66  
Within developing nations, the Chinese state-owned companies’ willingness to 
share technology, scientific advancements, and training techniques is a reflection of 
Chinese firms and their comfort level with operating in an unregulated economy as the 
one they were created in. With developing world experience, Chinese firms may be well 
suited for Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asian emerging markets. Additionally, 
China’s increasing consumption offers the nations of Asia, Latin America, Africa, and 
other developing regions an opportunity to take advantage of China’s growing demand 
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for resources, industrial components, and other goods to assist in their rapidly growing 
economy. By the end of 2007 Southeast Asia’s trade with China is expected to outgrow 
its trade with the United States or Japan. In 2005, the region’s economy excluding Japan 
was larger than the economy of Japan, illustrating China’s growing importance and 
potential to benefit all the developing nations in Southeast Asia.67 In turn China benefits 
from the goodwill that it accrues from its position as the economic engine lifting millions 
of people’s standard of living. Since 1992, South Korea has also experienced a rapid 
growth in trade with China. China has passed the United States as South Korea’s largest 
export market as hundreds of thousands of South Korean businesspeople visit China for 
trade. The phrase “China Fever” originated from a South Korean interest in all things 
Chinese.68  
Beyond Asia, Chinese trade with Africa grew by 250 percent between 2001 and 
2005 becoming the third largest trading partner for the continent. The Latin American 
trade with China has also grown to more than $40 billion annually as “Mines across Latin 
America report that they are working twenty-four hours per day just to keep up with 
Chinese demand for commodities.”69 China’s trade with Iran grew to $10 billion annually 
in 2006, and in the first six months of 2007 surged 70% from last year. Similarly in 
Central Asia, trade with Uzbekistan has grown by 1,000 percent in the most recent five 
years.70  Beijing assumes the position of the second largest trading partner in the world. 
The United States will remain the largest in the decade to come.   
China’s assertion as a benign rising power that offers fair trade recognizes that 
many developing nations suffered due to colonialism and imperialism. These bilateral 
trade agreements are government sponsored and therefore fall into the category of public 
diplomacy, an important institution of soft power. In 2001, Chinese officials suggested a 
free trade zone between China and ten Southeast Asian nations. The Chinese-Southeast 
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Asian agreement created the largest trade area in the world. China also started negotiating 
liberal trade agreements with sixteen other countries from Chile to New Zealand. Beijing 
accomplished such trade deals with Pakistan in 2006 and seeks to negotiate similar free 
trade deals with African nations.71 Beijing’s new strategy of establishing bilateral trade 
agreements and free trade zones without any conditions on trade partners, environmental 
issues, or labor rights, plays very well in many developing authoritarian nations. It also is 
a step towards China’s third goal of establishing a network of countries who share 
Beijing’s concerns of nations intervening in other’s affairs. 
In addition to making investments and offering favorable trade agreements, 
substantial aid programs are also a part of China’s new charm offensive. China usually 
determines its aid through informal meetings involving its ambassadors rather than 
formal declarations of aid. Therefore, rather than assuming that China’s aid is intended 
for purely economic development, its aid comes in the form of soft loans provided by 
Chinese banks or military equipment. Already, China’s Export-Import Bank is the largest 
source of loans to Africa, surpassing the loans provided by the World Bank.”72 The 
Export-Import Bank of China is linked to the central government through such examples 
as the Huawei Company, and the presence of Export-Import Bank representatives during 
Chinese official delegations. Regardless, China’s aid reached over $1.5 billion in 2004. 
Chinese aid to the Philippine’s government was four times as large as that provided by 
the United States, three times U.S. aid in Laos, and twice as large in Indonesia. Chinese 
aid in Burma and Cambodia reflect the same story, and in Central Asia Beijing’s recent 
$600 million aid package to Uzbekistan places it near Russia, Japan, and the United 
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significantly in Africa it reached $2.7 billion. Not forgetting that small nations also 
matter, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao provided $375 million in aid to tiny island nations in 
the remote Pacific.74  
China’s status as a developing nation could result in promised aid that never 
arrives, yet Beijing earns considerable goodwill and positive media coverage through its 
offers and high-profile projects. The $95 million in assistance provided by China after the 
Asian tsunami in 2004, while small in comparison to the $1 billion provided by Japan and 
the United States, received far greater media coverage in Asia. Chinese scholars 
commonly refer to such events as the “maxi-mini” strategy of getting the maximum 
return from the minimum outlay.75 Other examples of China’s goodwill from the smallest 
of aid donations include high-profile projects such as a new parliament building in 
Cambodia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building in Maputo, Mozambique, Laos’ 
capital’s streets, and hospitals in Luang Prabang, Laos. Countries are accustomed to 
receiving aid from Japan and the United States, yet China is a new donor that illustrates 
its position as a growing benign power with peaceful development in mind.  
An important example of the effects of China’s aid is its growing soft power in 
Maputo, Mozambique, the former Portuguese colony. Beijing provided the aid, 
construction, and labor for an investment and trade-promotion center, offered debt 
reduction, and promised economic assistance of $2 billion to assist in rebuilding 
Mozambique’s power infrastructure. Such aid also helps Chinese companies. Often the 
development of high-profile projects is delegated to Chinese firms that rely upon low-
interest loans from Chinese banks and recruit cheap Chinese labor. Maputo also 
illustrates how Chinese aid has increased in sophistication to provide assistance in debt 
reduction, economic assistance, and training programs for professionals. In fact, the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce currently trains three thousand professionals from 
developing nations each year and seeks to train ten thousand African professionals 
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annually.76 China is closely linking its charm offensive with its strategy to mitigate 
concerns of its economic rise, gather resources for its economy, increase its influence in 
parts of the world where major powers appear to be loosing influence, and cultivate 
enduring relationships with other developing nations.   
China often also uses aid to build relations with opinion leaders from the 
developing world. Potential heads of state like Cuba’s Raul Castro and young 
Vietnamese and Thai officials are invited to China for conferences, trips to study China’s 
economic model, speak with the Communist Party, and often such trips are funded by the 
Chinese government. Such procedures are especially successful in Southeast Asia where 
the Communist Party has established official relations with thirty-nine political parties 
alone.77 Specifically in Cambodia, Chinese aid is funding the construction of a new prime 
minister’s office and the Beijing Diplomacy Institute, training Cambodian officials from 
the ministries of tourism, foreign affairs, industry, and agriculture, and providing support 
to the ruling party.78  
China’s growth of its investment, trade, and aid sectors has considerably 
increased its attraction over the past three decades. Enticing developing world leaders 
while reinforcing its peaceful rise to power enables the developing world to view the 
Chinese model favorably in the 21st century. The “win-win” strategy of the charm 
offensive brings all the elements of soft power together; Chinese-culture, Chinese-
language, state-controlled media, exchange programs, ethnic Chinese, public diplomacy, 
government funded aid programs, investment, and free trade to achieve the five goals of 
the charm offensive. China’s soft power strategy appears to breed success. Aspects of this 
strategy are examined in the next chapter.  
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V. MEASURING SUCCESS  
A. EXPLICIT INDICATORS OF SUCCESS 
Since China’s charm offensive strategy is relatively recent, it is difficult to 
measure its success. Questions such as is the charm offensive working consistently 
around the globe arise. Is Beijing becoming more attractive, more persuasive, and more 
appealing? Have other nations accepted the benign image and economic development of 
China? Nevertheless, results of opinion studies, interest in Chinese culture and language, 
respect for Chinese diplomats, and the treatment of foreign ethnic Chinese are obvious 
starting points for researching these questions. 
In 2005 the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok commissioned a study to measure Thai 
perceptions of other nations. The results of this poll indicated that eighty three percent of 
Thais, perceived China as a non-threat, an influential external nation, and as a strong 
economic partner. In comparison the same study in 1998 found only twelve percent of 
Thais had a favorable opinion of China.79 Other polls and opinion surveys agree with 
these results. In 2005, a BBC poll of twenty-two nations from around the globe, which 
included developing nations, found that forty eight percent thought China’s role in the 
world was positive. Only thirty percent viewed China’s role as negative. In a follow-up 
poll by the BBC, China was viewed as more important than the United States in 
Indonesia, Nigeria, Kenya, and a majority of Latin America.80 With its growing 
economic power, which could threaten or dominate neighbors or partner developing 
nations, China is successful in portraying its benign image. Its neighbors and other 
developing nations simply cannot ignore China’s powerful economy and growing 
influence. 
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China’s appeal is reflected in the success of Chinese-language and cultural studies 
in the developing world. Chinese is vital to maintaining relations and building enduring 
relationships in developing nations. In Argentina, the number of students studying 
Mandarin at the University of Buenos Aires has tripled and enrolled more than a 
thousand students in the first two years of availability. The Sin Chew Daily, the largest 
Chinese-language newspaper grew in subscriptions from 845,000 in 1999 to 1.1 million 
in 2004, despite a decline in global newspaper reading. The Thai government’s new 
educational programs encourage every public school to teach Mandarin, and Laos’ main 
Chinese-language school has more than doubled its enrollment in the past five years. 
Surprisingly, Indonesia has reported a shortage of 100,000 Chinese-language instructors 
and Cambodia’s elementary school system has enrolled more than 10,000 students in 
Mandarin.81  
The appeal of China’s language and culture has extended to its developed 
neighbors such as South Korea. Since China is South Korea’s largest trading partner, a 
growing number of Koreans visit China and have returned to establish Chinese-language 
schools in Seoul. An estimated 160,000 South Korean students study Chinese, which 
reflects a sixty percent rise in the past five years.82 The demand for Chinese language has 
challenged English as the second language of choice in South Korea. Most importantly, 
the education exchanges have grown tremendously. South Korea sends 13,000 students 
each year to study in China, which is equal to the total number of Koreans who studied in 
the United States between 1953 and 1975.83  
Studying in China is quite attractive to students due to the availability of Chinese 
government scholarships. Such programs attractiveness allows Chinese universities to 
compete with Western schools, attracting some Western PhDs to serve as visiting 
professors. Between 2002 and 2004, Cambodian students in China increased by 20 
percent, Indonesian students increased by nearly 50 percent, as did the Vietnamese 
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students who increased by 90 percent. Overall, the number of Southeast Asian students 
doubled in the two year span joining 1,600 African students at Chinese universities.84 
The Chinese Ministry of Education estimates that Chinese universities will enroll more 
than 120,000 foreign students by next year. Granted a few do come from government 
sponsored missions including the Singaporean government which has made an effort to 
develop a cadre of diplomats with ties to China just as it has with the United States. 
Illustrating its global reach, China educated 1,500 people from 107 nations, primarily 
government officials, in public management and technology in 2003. The China Foreign 
Affairs University, Beijing’s diplomatic school, will triple enrollment from 2,500 to 
7,500 by 2008.85 Overall, it is evident that the appeal of China’s language and culture has 
enticed thousands to flock to China for education and exchange programs. 
The desire for learning the Chinese language has increased the interest in Chinese 
culture. As Hu Jintao announced in 2003 “Chinese culture belongs not only to the 
Chinese but also to the whole world.”86 Global magazines portray the glamorous Chinese 
lifestyle of ethnic Chinese in Bangkok, Chinese pop stars, artists, and even businessmen. 
In fact, despite Chinese government’s limits on artistic freedoms, China has developed a 
thriving art scene in Dashanzi and is the world’s second largest exporter of visual arts, 
according to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. A 
painting by the Chinese artist Zhang Xiaogang recently sold at a Sotheby’s auction for 
nearly $1 million.87  
China’s culture has also entered the fashion scene as popular shoes are made in 
China. Chinese shoe companies Li Ning and Belle International have watched their 
shares grow as much as 25%, and the Chinese sneaker brand Anta Sports Products soared 
42% on its opening day of trading in July of 2007. Investors want a foot in the door of 
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China’s $800 billion retail economy, which is expected to make a significant contribution 
to worldwide net retail sales growth by the end of next year. Investors are currently 
seeking exposure into China’s retail and cultural markets. Among those wooed by the 
Chinese style is National Basketball Association’s Houston Rockets, Leslie Alexander, a 
successful stock trader who subscribed to 8% of Anta Sports Products’ shares.88 China’s 
brand and style is important to urbanized Chinese and young people around the world, 
which has spread not only by word of mouth but also through the attraction of even the 
simplest of Chinese products, shoes.  
China’s culture has also permeated the literary scene. In Vietnam, the Ministry of 
Culture’s Publishing Department indicated half of all the foreign books translated in the 
country are by Chinese writers like Gao Xingjian who won China’s first Nobel Prize for 
Literature in 2000.89 Even Chinese-language television, music, and film are appealing to 
more developing nations. The Philippines hosts its own Chinese film festival and even 
Hollywood studios are beginning to search for opportunities in China. Hollywood 
producers Bob Weinstein and Harvey Weinstein (founders of Miramax) launched a $285 
million movie fund that will invest in Asian-themed projects. One of the projects will be 
an action film about the Chinese folk heroine Hua Mulan and another, “The Forbidden 
Kingdom” is currently filming in China. Weinstein Company hopes to take advantage of 
not only lower costs by shooting in China, but produce movies that appeal to Chinese and 
Western markets.90 Clearly the owners of Miramax films hope to spread China’s culture 
and market its attraction. Additionally, at the Venice International Film Festival in 2006, 
“Still Life” won the Golden Lion for best film and even other Chinese movies such as 
“Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon” became the highest grossing non-English film.91 
Clearly, China’s television, singers, musicians, artists, and actors have assisted in 
spreading China’s culture globally.  
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Surprisingly in developing nations, print and broadcast media ignore any concerns 
of China’s growing economic power, influence, human rights abuses, and poor quality 
control. Also developed nation’s media and print ignore concerns about China, like 
Google tailoring the content of their sites to please Beijing.92 The decidedly more 
positive media coverage of China reflects China’s control of foreign news outlets, which 
limits coverage of the state-controlled media Xinjiang and other problems in China. It is 
also an indication of more important stories grabbing headlines and may reflect the 
success of Chinese diplomats in other countries to persuade local media sources or outlets 
from publicizing stories which reflect poorly on Beijing. China’s ability to influence the 
global media is an indication of Beijing’s growing soft power.  
Nevertheless, elites in most developing nations have embraced China as their 
leader, convinced by their new strategy. They see opportunities for their own nations, 
people, economy, businesses and political parties. Chinese diplomats and businesspeople 
are welcomed just like those from America, Europe and Japan. Whether it is a state 
banquet or upgrading bilateral trade ties, the access granted to the Chinese diplomats by 
developing nations reflect the level of efforts undertaken by Beijing. The Chinese 
diplomats’ knowledge of the local language, culture, traditions, and experience to the 
point of being mistaken as a local, illustrates the training, dedication, and importance of 
Beijing’s objectives to show itself as a benign economic partner with only the best 
intentions in a “win-win” strategy. 
Beijing has consistently reached out to foreign ethnic Chinese to improve ties 
with other nations within the developing world. Chinese Indonesians have seen a 
reduction in discrimination and are more integrated into Indonesian society, celebrating 
the Chinese New Year, visiting China for vacations, assisting ethnic Chinese victims of 
the December 2004 tsunami, and running for regional legislatures. The warming relations 
with Beijing are diametrically opposed to Beijing’s decision in 1998 to not intervene in 
the Indonesia riots in which Muslim leaders targeted the country’s Chinese minority 
blaming them for the country’s financial crisis. However, perhaps the non-responsive 
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Beijing was simply part of the charm offensive to assure its neighbors that it would not 
interfere in another country’s affairs. Apparently, given the successes of the ethnic 
Chinese today in Indonesia the strategy was successful as Indonesian leaders understand 
Beijing to be noninterventionist.93  
Warming relations between Beijing and foreign ethnic Chinese is successful 
elsewhere as well. The former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand paid a 
visit to Guangdong province in 2001, the homeland of his ancestors emphasizing his 
ethnic Chinese background and therefore his ability to strengthen relations between 
Bangkok and Beijing. The efforts were successful in forging a Thailand-China strategic 
partnership responsible for the Sirindhorn Center, a new Chinese-language and cultural 
facility at the Mae Fah Luang University in northern Thailand, followed by an agreement 
to increase bilateral trade to $50 billion by 2010.94 Thai politicians and businesspeople 
alike continue to associate with their Chinese heritage because of China’s increasing 
power. As a result, China is now viewed as Thailand’s close friend, facilitated by China’s 
diplomatic corps, aid, investment, language, culture, and ethnic Chinese in Thailand.  
Another explicit example of China’s charm offensive in Southeast Asia includes 
the budding relationship between Beijing and East Timor. Upon independence in 1999, 
the Timorese sought Beijing’s leadership’s assistance under the UN mission in 
reconstructing their country. China’s aid to Dili has included the construction of East 
Timor’s Foreign Ministry, an embassy in Beijing, a new presidential palace, and 
increasing Chinese migration to Dili under government policies offering assistance in 
seeking business opportunities. China’s hand is visible in a number of areas of Timorese 
civic life such as building barracks and providing uniforms for the country’s small 
military, bringing in medical teams and police, training civil servants and farmers and 
inviting students and official delegations to Beijing. Dili responded by move closer to 
Portuguese speaking Chinese diplomats fostering enduring relationships. Additionally, 
Dili formally established diplomatic relations with Beijing. China became the first 
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country with which independent Timor established diplomatic relations.95 Since then, 
Chinese government sponsored companies gained rights to conduct seismic studies in 
Timor to determine the resources available in the oil and gas rich Timor Sea, containing 
an estimated $30 billion worth of deposits.96 China’s influence has spread across East 
Timor encouraging young people to study Chinese in private classes. Beijing’s diplomat 
corps, increased aid, and acting as the leader of developing nations has brought China 
closer to achieving its goals of becoming a great benign power and securing economic 
and strategic resources by not intervening in another nation’s affairs and remembering 
that small nations just like East Timor do matter.  
B. IMPLICIT INDICATORS OF SUCCESS 
By recalling China’s goals and achievements, it is possible to take an implicit 
look at China’s success. China has not enjoyed unchecked success in achieving its goals, 
and because the charm offensive does include coercive elements it is difficult to judge if 
China is pulling or pushing other nations. Additionally, China’s charm offensive is a 
global strategy which differs for each region of the world. Therefore, not all aspects are 
employed equally nor are they directly involved in compelling nations to take actions not 
already in their interest.  
However, recalling China’s goals of the “win-win” strategy it is evident some 
success is achieved through soft power. China’s goals include maintaining a peaceful 
development in the Asian region, specifically on its borders, portray a benign image, 
secure the necessary resources to feed its economy, isolate Taiwan, promote the China 
model and be the leader of the developing world to pursue a course to becoming a great 
power.  
China’s “win-win” strategy’s success is due to real initiatives and results. Beijing 
in the late 1990’s began a “new security concept” aimed at guaranteeing the country’s 
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security and that of other nations through working towards mutual trust with neighboring 
nations and multilateral organizations. China ended several all of its border disputes by 
committing to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a document commanding respect for 
the sovereignty and equality of ten countries in ASEAN. Further Beijing initiated a code 
of conduct on the South China Sea, signed the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone, and signed numerous bilateral cooperative agreements and strategic partnerships 
with several Asian nations.97 While many of these are not formal alliances, they contain 
specific elements that may lead in that direction, and in the meantime bolster China’s 
image as benign and as a growing power. 
Furthermore in Asia, China is an active participant in the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, supporting the first East Asia Summit, and creating an Asia Cooperation Fund to 
assist Chinese government agencies in their coordination with ASEAN. In Latin 
America, China used similar tactics by signing real initiatives under the “win-win” 
strategy that portrays China as a non-threatening actor. Vice President Zeng Qinghong in 
a trip while visiting Mexico in January of 2005 signed seven cooperation accords on 
maritime transportation and numerous other topics using the opportunity to create a 
foundation for more substantial partnerships in the future. Later the same year, Zeng 
signed nineteen accords with Venezuela.98 China has joined the Organization of 
American States as an observer, the Inter-American Development Bank, and it signed an 
agreement on closer relations with the Andean Community. 
In Africa, China established a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2000 and 
the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development, both 
designed to foster cooperation on economic, health, development, and diplomat matters. 
Since 2000, China signed more than forty bilateral cooperation agreements with African 
states.99 China provided economic aid to the African Union and assumed a larger role in 
the African Development Bank through the Chinese Development Bank.  
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Beijing succeeded in building peaceful relations with a majority of its regional 
neighbors and ended border disputes. Leaders of nations throughout Asia have accepted 
China as a constructive player in global affairs which works as a shot of adrenaline to 
their economy. The Chinese government’s objective of becoming a global power and the 
leader of developing nations has gained support in the past ten years. For instance, the 
Philippines government established closer military relations in 2005 despite China’s 
attempt a decade ago to claim the South China Sea. The Chinese appeal and influence 
within the Philippines is not an isolated incident. The National Bureau of Asian Research 
reported, “Southeast Asian states generally perceive China’s rise as more of an 
opportunity…The majority of Asian states currently view China as more benign than 
malign, and are accommodating themselves to China’s rise.”100 China’s rise increases 
Beijing’s influence capability evident in regional democratic leaders’ ability to warm to 
Beijing when supported by the public, as evident in the Philippines, East Timor, and 
Thailand. Semi-authoritarian nations such as Malaysia also considered upgrading their 
strategic partnership with Beijing to a formal alliance. Meanwhile, countries like 
Venezuela and other authoritarian regimes have sought to build warmer relations with 
Beijing.  
Overall Beijing’s improved relations with various nations are attributable to 
China’s rising strength and growing economy. China’s actions ease fears of its potential 
growth to other developing nations through its aid, investment, and cultural appeal. 
Establishing ties to Beijing is due to Chinese success in portraying itself has a non-threat 
and hence, increasing its soft power. 
However, Beijing’s success in increasing appeal has some limitations. Some 
nations remain insecure with the Chinese rise, especially those which had conflictual 
relations with China in the past.  For example, Vietnam seeks to build formal relations 
with other Asian nations and the United States to counterbalance Beijing. Some segments 
of South Korean as well are concerned over the popularity of China in the general public 
and within their legislators. One poll indicated 63 percent of ROK legislators viewed 
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China as the most important nation. Such polls represent a difficult challenge for those 
who rather have the United States as the top priority in South Korea rather than China.101 
Though Beijing’s acquisition of resources, namely oil and gas fields, is not 
equivalent to that of American and European companies, its distribution of its sources 
around the globe and investment in future potentials, appear to be the actions of an 
expansionist power. China’s state-owned companies have amassed holdings in numerous 
foreign markets such as Venezuela, Peru, Sudan, Nigeria, Kazakhstan, Iran, and Saudi 
Arabia. However, China does not need to woo small resource rich nations. In 2006, Saudi 
Arabia and China entered into an agreement to create a strategic reserve of Saudi oil in 
China. China’s state controlled China National Petroleum Corporation established an 
office in Riyadh and increased trade by more than 50 percent between the two nations.102 
Recently, PetroChina sought the assistance of U.S. energy company Chevron Corporation 
to develop a natural-gas field in Sichuan province, marking a rare inroad by a foreign 
company into China’s onshore oil and natural-gas production. The cooperation between 
the two companies is an indicator of not only China’s acquisition of resources, but also its 
attraction of worldwide energy companies.103 Even tiny Transmeridian, a small Houston 
based oil company who owns strategically important fields in Kazakhstan, attracted 
China’s National Development and Reform Commission’s attention. Given the proximity 
of Kazakhstan to China and the Central Asian pipeline funded by Beijing, it is likely the 
small company’s holdings will be purchased by China’s Zhenhua Oil. Due to China’s 
growing oil consumption and stagnant domestic crude output, state oil companies are 
seeking access to overseas reserves through acquisitions.104  
Recently, China’s agreement to produce and import natural gas from 
Turkmenistan represents a big step in the realignment of the resource-rich Central Asian 
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republic away from its former partners in Russia. Under this agreement, China seeks to 
buy 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas a year from Turkmenistan and neighboring 
Kazakhstan for the next 30 years, to be delivered through a new pipeline built by the 
Chinese. In September 2007, China approved the pipeline to provide natural gas from 
Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Guangzhou province, the country’s 
industrial base in the southeast. Most importantly Turkmenistan’s natural gas resources 
play an important role in the geopolitics of the region. Until the new pipeline is 
completed, Russia and Ukraine control the only export routes for Turkmenistan’s natural 
gas. Those countries have periodically squeezed their smaller rival, leading to disruptions 
in Turkmenistan’s exports. Therefore, Turkmenistan is eager to break free from Russia’s 
influence and it sees exports to China as one solution.105  Smaller nations have found it 
easier to offer Beijing resources because of its policy to support small nations, and to 
remain uninvolved in a nation’s affairs. As another sign of China’s growing importance 
as an energy consumer, a Bahrain developer announced a $5 billion plan to build a 
business park for the oil industry outside Beijing.106  
China also seeks to fill a void which has been created due to faltering bilateral 
relationships with major powers in several smaller countries. For instance, China courted 
Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan leader, inviting him on a state visit to China, increasing 
trade ties, and most notably supporting Venezuela’s bid for a position on the United 
Nations Security Council. Similarly, China sought to improve its relations with Evo 
Morales, president of Bolivia in 2005 by inviting him to Beijing for a state visit. Likewise 
in Uzbekistan, China expressed support to Tashkent, inviting the Uzbekistan dictator 
Islam Karimov for a state visit to build an enduring relationship. Sudan, a highly debated 
country at the moment, received projects of enormous scale due to Chinese support, 
which were completed ahead of schedule and on time for the tenth anniversary of the 
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Dictator Omar Bashir’s coup.107 Likewise in the Philippines, China wooed President 
Macapagal-Arroyo during a state visit, offering greater cooperation and aid upon faltering 
U.S.-Filipino relations caused by the withdrawal of Philippine troops from Iraq and 
decreased American aid to Manila.108 Clearly these countries all have a commonality, 
energy resources and reserves all to be developed by Chinese government-funded 
projects to meet the charm offensive’s second goal: strategic energy resources to feed the 
growing Chinese economy. 
China’s noninterference policy won the most partners in the developing world 
while drawing attention from the United States and Europe. Yet, China uses its soft 
power via its noninterference policy to influence nations to act according to Beijing 
desires. With its improved relations with neighboring countries and those in the Asia 
region, Beijing is able to make the most of its soft power influence within the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations. Though the group of nations is responsible for the interests 
of the region, China has come to dominate. Countries like Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, 
and Vietnam often seem to consider Beijing’s interests first before their own. Granted 
this does appear to be a wise strategy at times considering China is the most rapidly 
growing economy with the largest potential and there may be a trickle down effect, yet it 
is something to be concerned about.  
However, the trickle down effect does not mean nations will always make 
decisions in their best interest. China is the largest aid donor and foreign influence in 
Cambodia, but Beijing’s 2006 decision to dam portions of the Mekong River sent a flood 
of concerns through Cambodia. China refused to join the Mekong River Commission and 
commissioned its own environmental impact assessment of its dams that proceeded with 
a one day trip. Though Cambodians were unsatisfied with the results a Chinese 
delegation visited Cambodia promising aid, emphasized the Chinese culture is for the 
world to enjoy, and promised to enforce environmental standards. Prime Minister Hun 
Sen essentially had his hands tied after the Chinese had appealed to the general public of 
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Cambodia and instructed his diplomats to not make an issue of the Mekong River 
project.109 In this regard, China reflected its poor values as a nation with weak 
environmental standards, disregarded their own good neighbor and small country policy, 
but did wield their soft power to influence a nation to make a decision it might not have 
otherwise chosen. 
On the other hand, China’s aid policies have opened doors for Cambodia. 
Committed to a new anticorruption strategy, the World Bank threatened to suspend 
hundreds of millions of dollars to Cambodia because of rampant corruption allegations 
and a reduction in civil liberties in late 2004. Instead of complying with the World Bank, 
Cambodia turned to China and received $600 million worth of loans and grants. The aid 
compensated for what would have been a devastating loss of funds, had the World Bank 
frozen the funds allocated for Cambodia. Although the World Bank took no action for 
fear it would loose all influence in the country and now Western donors feel obliged to 
continue assisting the small country because of its ties to Beijing.110 In this matter, 
Beijing has greatly increased its ability to influence not just small nations, but those 
providing aid, and in the process created a network of nations with it as the focal point.  
Outside of Southeast Asia, China has leveraged its influence with individual 
African states. In Zambia for example, China is one of the largest investors in the local 
copper industry and one of the largest providers of aid. When the possible electoral 
victory of an opposition candidate in 2006 known for speaking against China’s poor labor 
standards emerged, the Chinese ambassador threatened a discontinuation of diplomatic 
relations if the elections did not turn out as Beijing desired. The effort may have 
contributed to the success of the incumbent as the opposition leader lost the presidential 
election and China overtly influenced an African election with their soft power.111 
Just as China must maintain its model of economic development and political 
stability, it must not act aggressively in exerting outside influence, otherwise it risks a 
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decline in its soft power. China’s diplomat corps must remain aware of its good neighbor 
and small country policy while not acting increasingly arrogant and disdainful of other 
developing nations. Forgetting to listen to other nations, or not following their own 
objective of not interfering with another nation’s affairs will cause the charm offensive 
and “win-win” strategy to loose its appeal. Within Southeast Asia, Singapore is most 
skeptical of China’s charm offensive, suggesting it is merely a façade and has responded 
by bolstering defense cooperation with the United States. Likewise, many ASEAN 
nations were offended as Beijing pressured neighboring nations not to meet with the 
Japanese delegation and to reject any proposals authored by Tokyo during the East Asia 
Summit.112 A continuation of this behavior may likely result in a rapid decline of 
Beijing’s ability to exert influence and the effectiveness of the charm offensive. 
China’s hard power objectives are reflected in its charm offensive when one looks 
at its success in isolating Taiwan. In Latin America, countries are formally recognizing 
Beijing and renouncing Taipei for closer relations and economic benefits. Though 
Taiwan retains nearly half of its formal allies in Latin America, China’s economic 
growth, aid, investment, and increasing attractiveness has swayed Venezuela, Peru, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Dominica, Grenada, and Guatemala to switch recognition to Beijing.113 
Recalling Beijing’s status as an observer at the Organization of American States, this 
privilege is consistently denied to Taiwan. Should Panama, one of the last remaining 
nations to recognize Taiwan, switch recognition caused by the aid, education, and 
investment provided by Beijing, the few Central American nations would likely follow, 
leaving Taiwan with no formal allies in all of Central and South America. The trend 
continues in Africa. South Africa, the Central African Republic, Liberia, and Senegal 
have all switched recognition from Taiwan to China in the last decade citing promising 
aid, investment, cultural and educational opportunities, and state companies backed with 
a noninterference position.  
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In Southeast Asia the informal embassies of Taiwan, the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Offices, have been forced out of Cambodia and informal visits have been 
canceled by the Indonesian, Philippine, and Malaysian governments.114 Within Southeast 
Asia, Beijing has attempted to woo Australia through high level political visits, favorable 
trade conditions, and contracts on energy-related products in an effort to persuade 
Australia not to send troops to assist the United States in any conflict over Taiwan. 
Beijing’s goal is to use its soft power to influence Australia to be part of a China 
dominated “grand neighbor region” in Asia to “force a wedge between the U.S. and 
Australia” in an effort to further isolate Taiwan.115 
Obviously Taiwan experienced a great decline in its soft power and Beijing 
punished those that have not switched recognition. The Republic of Macedonia learned 
the hard way the cost of crossing Beijing on Taiwan. After Skopje established diplomatic 
relations with Taipei in the 1990’s, China used its veto power in the United Nations 
Security Council to block passage of a peacekeeping bill to aid Macedonia. At the UN 
General Assembly in September 2005, President Hu offered debt forgiveness and duty-
free entry to exports from the world’s poor countries, except for those countries that 
recognize Taipei.116 Foreign ethnic Chinese and nations switching recognition are aware 
of the potential economic gains and are making decisions in their best interest. For a state 
to switch recognition and warm relations with Beijing who is promising aid, investment, 
economic opportunity, and education damages their country very little, but pleases China 
greatly and potentially avoids a missed opportunity.  
China’s model of economic growth with limited political change is appealing to 
several nations. In Vietnam, Iran and Syria, regimes are attempting to duplicate China’s 
success in promoting development while postponing or preventing any political 
liberalization. Despite Vietnam’s hesitation to establish formal relations with China, they 
have adopted the Chinese model of slowly opening the economy while maintaining 
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control of the political system. Iran has followed suit by traveling to China to study the 
Chinese model and Syria has openly broadcasted its desire to move toward the same 
model of development.117 The Shanghai index’s 91 percent growth in 2007 suggests that 
China’s continued economic boom, and China’s master planners are intent on keeping its 
economy growing through next year’s Olympics in Beijing to ensure the China model of 
economic growth and development is displayed on an international platform.118 
In Latin America and Africa, the China model of government-directed growth and 
poverty reduction has resonated well. Advertising a model counter to the Washington 
Consensus, the Beijing Consensus bodes well in developing nations with trends 
illustrating a desire for state controlled economies and a higher tolerance for semi-
authoritarian and authoritarian regimes. In Brazil, President Lula deployed teams of 
advisers to Beijing to study the China model, as has Raul Castro along with other Cuban 
officials and executives.119 In Africa the story is the same. Both Nigerian leaders and the 
African Development Bank have sought to learn from the Chinese after the failure of 
Western economic initiatives in the past decades.  
Drew Thompson, a China scholar who studies Beijing’s strategy towards Africa 
notes, “The Chinese government has also actively promoted their own brand of economic 
development and reform model to African countries, encouraging…African governments 
to fashion their economic systems after China’s own.”120 China’s ability to illustrate 
itself as a model of success for top-down political and economic development is a 
success. In contrast to the Washington Consensus, which failed in many Latin American 
and African nations, the Beijing Consensus appealed to many authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian developing nations. For countries like Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Sudan, Bolivia, 
Argentina, and many others like them, China’s model shows how an economy can 
liberalize to a degree, but ensure the ruling party remains in power. The China model is 
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appealing to any struggling developing nation and aids in China’s third goal of 
developing a network of allies who share Beijing’s concerns of nations intervening in 
other’s affairs. 
China’s appeal to autocrats is increased by the supply of technology to countries 
such as North Korea, Pakistan, and Libya, but is best exemplified by its relationship with 
Iran. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was invited by the Chinese government in 
June 2006 to address the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The audience included 
Chinese, Russian, and Central Asian leaders with collaboration by senior advisors on 
economic and political management.121 Most recently China’s Chery Automobile 
Corporation, a state-owned firm, signed an agreement with Iran Khodro, Iran’s biggest 
auto maker, to invest $370 million in a plant to assemble cars for Iran and neighboring 
countries.122 Further, not only has China financed Iranian petroleum infrastructure to 
fulfill and meet its objective of securing strategic energy resources for its growing 
economy, but also this strategic move brings China closer to achieving its third goal; 
building a network of nations who share Beijing concerns for nations meddling in other’s 
affairs.  
To continue the appeal of China’s model, China itself must maintain its example 
in more than economic terms. Civil unrest must remain controlled and China’s influence 
must not get too persuasive. China’s banking sector is perhaps supporting nonperforming 
loans and unstable deals with state-controlled firms, causing alarm about the true strength 
of the Chinese economy. The urban and rural income divide is beginning to exceeded 
reasonable trends as the eastern provinces are significantly wealthier than the western 
provinces causing an increase in demonstrations and mass incidents. Any decline in these 
areas would result in a disastrous blow to China’s soft power appeal. 
The appeal of China is attracting not just other governments, but also their 
citizens. Poorer neighboring countries such as Laos, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, North 
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Korea, and even eastern parts of Russia have noted with concern their citizens seeking 
China as a land of opportunity. Though the urban and rural income divide is dangerously 
great, it is rarely ever publicized, leaving a perception of a wealthy China with no poor 
areas, even though China’s per capita income remains lower than the United States and 
Europe. Despite the divide, citizens of neighboring countries are witnesses to Chinese 
diplomats and their associated business delegations acquiring resources, promoting the 
language, culture, and bringing good fortune to their own nations, therefore portraying a 
wealthy image. Such images are attracting the citizens of other nations to take desperate 
measures to reach China. Non-Chinese often join migrant workers, traders, search for a 
Chinese spouse, and go to great lengths to blend in to the western provinces of China’s 
ethnically diverse society in order to better their standard of living.123 This illustrates the 
potential of strong soft power and its ability to attract citizens from the region to flock to 
China to seek opportunity and a chance to live life better. 
Chinese have begun to return from Taiwan. Terry Gou is a native of Taiwan who 
founded the Hon Hai factory, China’s biggest exporter and the world’s biggest contract 
manufacturer of electronics. Though Hon Hai is publicly traded in Taiwan, Mr. Gou 
sought opportunity in China’s growth beginning in 1988 due to abundant land and cheap 
labor. Conveniently located in Shenzhen, Mr. Gou employs more than 270,000 workers 
making Apple iPods, iPhones, Hewlett-Packard computers, Motorola mobile phones and 
employs a total of 450,000 workers at plants across a dozen provinces within China and 
in factories across the globe including Mexico, Brazil, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Vietnam, and India. Mr. Gou, estimated to be worth more than $10 billion has certainly 
sought a better life, not in Taiwan, but in China thanks to the attractive nature of 
Beijing’s soft power.124  
Americans as well are drawn to China because of its culture, economic prosperity, 
and opportunities. For instance, Bay Area professionals who have experienced the Silicon 
Valley boom have relocated to Shanghai and Beijing as “change-the-world 
entrepreneurs” believing this is the start of the China Century. For what might have 
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begun as a one year trip is now a permanent home for many families citing the Chinese 
language and way of thinking as attractive aspects of China’s soft power, broadening the 
horizons of their children and themselves. The idea of investing in China from the inside 
has attracted many and with the government moving to decrease corruption and increase 
transparency it is a wonder when more Americans will seek to establish their home in 
urban China.125  
As an emerging leader of the developing nations, China has assumed its position 
well. When Thailand devalued its currency in 1997 due to a major financial crisis, it lost 
its investors and depositors requested their funds returned. Construction of high-rise 
buildings in Bangkok stopped, which still stand today, and financial companies declared 
bankruptcy one after another. Unemployment skyrocketed and the Thai government 
collapsed under the pressures of the financial crisis. As a formal U.S. ally, Thailand 
suspected Washington would provide a bailout package. However, as aid was delayed 
Beijing publicly refused to devalue the Thai currency, advertising its decision to support 
other developing Asian nations. “The Chinese Government with a high sense of 
responsibility, decided not to devaluate its renminbi in the overall interest of maintaining 
stability and development in the region” said the Chinese Foreign Ministry.126 Beijing’s 
rapid response worked as it strengthened China’s position in the region by gaining 
publicity and the media’s attention in Thailand, leaving a lasting impression on the Thai 
as to who first came to their aid despite a massive financial bailout package eventually 
offered by Japan, the United States, and the International Monetary Fund.  
Now less than a year away, the 2008 Olympic Beijing Games will test China’s 
position as a rising power. The Olympic spectacle viewed as a metaphor for China’s 
rising power illustrates many complex variables including cleaner air, open media access, 
and hygienic conditions for athletes. Beijing is well ahead logistically in preparing for the 
influx of more than two million spectators from the world and has even invested $70 
million in Hohhot, in Inner Mongolia, building a new airport and highway linked to 
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Beijing in case weather stalls Beijing’s airport traffic. Roads throughout the country are 
improved in the name of the Olympics and sponsorships worth nearly $1.5 billion are 
ensuring that 2008 will be the most commercially successful Games. For instance, Steven 
Spielberg has agreed to help design the opening and closing ceremonies.  
However, environmental concerns of air quality, which currently exceeds the 
World Health Organization’s clean-air guidelines by 78% has not only officials 
concerned, but also athletes who wish to shatter records. U.S. athletes will be equipped 
with activated charcoal masks, ibuprofen and asthma medication to combat Beijing’s 
pollution. Beijing has begun to conduct trials of traffic limitations, removing 1.3 million 
vehicles from the roads, more than a third of the city’s total to improve the air quality, but 
with little visible impact on air quality with layers of smog still visible. Stricter car-
emission standards have been imposed, factories in surrounding areas have been closed, 
and a vast tree-planting initiative has begun in an effort to prevent any postponements of 
some sporting events during next year’s Games. Beijing has drawn historical parallels to 
the 1988 Games in Seoul, which crowned South Korea’s economic miracle, and 
transition from a military dictatorship to a direct and fair presidential election. However, 
Beijing still faces difficulty in meeting human-rights issues, open reporting for not simply 
foreign reporters but local journalists as well, and other limitations of free speech which 
would ever allow for a democracy to be born. Nevertheless, China has invested $38 
billion and may spend a total of $67 billion on its Games to showcase the emergence of 
Beijing and much of China from a developing country into a first-world power.127  
As a leader in the developing world, Hu Jintao addressed Brazil in 2004 
announced China would “stay on the side of the developing countries.”128 In 2005 Hu 
met with the leaders of Brazil, India, Mexico, and South Africa to affirm China’s 
dedication to a partnership and leadership of developing nations. The Chinese leadership 
has not only continued in Latin America and Africa, but also in Asia. Throughout 
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meetings of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization China is the 
spokesperson for developing nations, building its benign image, and often succeeding in 
its fourth goal of the strategy: assuming the role of a great power.  
For China to pursue a course to grow into a great power, it needs to create 
relations with nations around the globe who share common interests. Beijing is successful 
in this so far when promoting their benign image, economic and political model, and 
noninterference behavior. With a great number of nations attracted to the Chinese dragon, 
it is increasingly difficult for members of the United Nations Security Council to stop a 
Chinese initiative. Conversely, should the United States, England, and France call for 
action against rogue states, China can assemble a bloc to block an initiative. The Chinese 
coalition recently assembled in 2004 to defeat a Washington sponsored United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights investigation in China. Half of the supporting nations 
were from Africa who had benefited from Chinese aid and investment, were likely 
authoritarian or semi authoritarian benefiting from the Chinese model, and were in line 
with China’s noninterference policy. In this respect China, with its mutually-reinforcing 
goals, has wooed a great deal of nations via its charm offensive to protect itself, as long 
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VI. MIXED RESULTS  
A. POSITIVE GLOBAL RESULTS 
With Beijing’s growing influence in the world, the charm offensive could use its 
newly acquired power to promote positive change. Whether supporting multilateral 
organizations, mediating disputes, fighting narcotics, reducing human trafficking, 
stopping the spread of HIV and other infectious diseases, toughening safety and labor 
measures, or bringing economic opportunity, China’s soft power can be wielded 
responsibly. If China seeks to develop peacefully and evolve into a great power it will 
have to use its soft power to serve the global good, and assist the United Nations and 
regional focus groups to solve severe problems.  
Positive signs of how China will use its soft power do exist. Beijing’s shift to 
supporting multilateral organizations, joining international nonproliferation agreements, 
and even sending Chinese peacekeepers or police under the UN flag to developing states 
such as Liberia, Haiti, or East Timor is encouraging and furthers its soft power. 
Peacekeeping support has grown and today China has more troops participating in UN 
peacekeeping missions than any other permanent member of the Security Council.129 In 
an effort to assume the role of a great power, not only has Beijing committed over 3,000 
peacekeeping forces to the United Nations, but also has begun to mediate other 
developing nations’ disputes, a task normally reserved for a great power.130 As a 
proactive mediator, China has stepped in to resolve feuds such as between Thailand and 
Cambodia in early 2003. Both nations had come close to engaging in a severe border war 
and because Cambodia has poor relations with the United States, both countries turned to 
Beijing for assistance. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi called upon the Thai and 
Cambodian representatives in Beijing to reconcile their differences. Perhaps both 
countries realized that not normalizing relations and continuing to threaten each other, 
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causing an unstable region posed a risk of disrupting trade and aid provided by China. 
Within weeks Thailand and Cambodia normalized their relationship and trade and aid 
from China continued.131  
Most importantly, China is the backbone of the Six-Party Talks. Washington, 
Tokyo, Seoul, and Moscow have turned to Beijing, Pyongyang’s longtime ally and major 
provider of aid, food and energy, to host the six-way talks on the North Korean nuclear 
program. Chinese officials were able to entice the North Koreans to come to the table 
through increased aid and invited Kim Jong Il to the southern provinces of China to show 
off economic growth and study the Chinese economic reforms.132 However, upon North 
Korea’s withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, Beijing publicly displayed anger, shutting 
down an oil pipeline to Pyongyang and took measures to freeze North Korea’s holdings 
in several banking institutions in Macau. Even more aggressive steps were taken after 
North Korea tested a nuclear weapon, including agreeing to UN sanctions on Pyongyang, 
ceasing all oil exports to North Korea, and sending a high level delegation to Pyongyang 
in an effort to return the Koreans back to the table.133  
Beijing acts out of self interest in this matter. President Hu Jintao certainly does 
not want a nuclear Pyongyang capable of targeting every Chinese city, but also if Kim is 
able to acquire the ultimate deterrence, nuclear weapons, he will be more reluctant to 
meet with Beijing and afford Hu the opportunity to exercise any influence.134 Therefore, 
China is granted the leading role in the region regarding this matter. It may lead to an 
accomplishment of a long desired goal of pursuing a nuclear free North Korea, working 
with the other nations involved, boosting China’s appeal, and thereby gaining the respect 
of those involved nations.  
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Revisiting a terrible addiction of the past, China has recently seen a rise in heroin 
use in parts of its country. China’s efforts to prohibit drug trafficking is limited to its 
borders and namely in its relations with Burma. In the fall of 2003, China began to 
express concern over the flow of drugs out of northeastern Burma and into China. In 
response, Beijing restricted visas into parts of Burma and massed troops along the 
Burmese border. Simultaneously, China pressured the Burmese government to fight 
narcotics within its borders and coordinated enforcement cooperation.135 Results have 
been positive as Chinese authorities have seized heroin along the Burmese border. In 
conjunction with this progress, Chinese officials clearly understand the threats posed by 
drug trafficking and have publicized this through signing several UN drug conventions, 
hosting multinational events on drug control, and initiated training for its legislative and 
judicial departments in regards to combating transnational crime. 
Likewise, Beijing has sought to reduce human trafficking recently capturing a 
major “snake head” or people smuggler who charged $90,000 per person to leave China 
for Canada.136 Additionally, along its borders China has sought local government support 
to educate women in border regions about HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. 
China strongly encouraged its neighbors to do the same in regards to its educational 
programs and in 2004 formed a joint effort with Vietnam to fight human trafficking, an 
effort which included educational programs and law-enforcement cooperation.137 
Similarly, despite the outbreak of SARS in China in 2003, Beijing has begun to use its 
influence to promote cooperation in fighting infectious diseases. In response to the avian 
flu, China responded by assisting other countries to develop bird flu early warning 
systems and worked with multilateral organizations to strengthen quarantines. However, 
most recently, international animal-health experts have flown to Vietnam to determine 
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whether a new virus afflicting pigs in China has spread, rekindling tensions over China’s 
cooperation in alerting the outside world to diseases within its borders.138  
In response to food, drug, and product safety concerns which have emerged in the 
past year, China has sought to uphold its China model and ensure its soft power does not 
decline. Imposing tougher rules on exports, China’s premier ordered increased vigilance 
over food and drug safety as the State Council announced a new regulation that mandates 
stronger supervision and outlines hefty punishments for makers of dangerous goods. 
These two measures highlight Beijing’s focus on winning back international confidence 
in its exports after threats from Europe’s consumer commissioner, Meglena Kuneva who 
was prepared to block access to the European markets if Beijing did not improve its 
product safety standards.139 “Food safety and product quality should be our top 
priority…It is not only an urgent task, but an arduous and long-term task,” said Premier 
Wen Jiabao. As a slew of exports from pet-food, toothpaste, tires, and seafood have been 
recalled or rejected around the world China’s soft power has declined. In response, 
Beijing and its leadership has sought to hold local governments responsible for producers 
of food, agricultural products and drugs. In April of this year, the State Council 
announced plans to expand the country’s food and drug safety surveillance network, 
increase inspections, establish an emergency response mechanism, and put recall 
procedures in place over the next five years. Xinhua reported the arrest of fifteen 
members of a gang responsible for phony rabies vaccines and blood proteins, a public 
illustration of China’s firmer stance on product regulations and production standards, all 
of which are in an effort to produce a better and safer product for global consumption and 
to restore confidence in Chinese exports.140  
President Hu Jintao’s administration is furthering its commitment to improve 
living standards and equality by taking authority away from China’s powerful local 
governments. Provincial and local governments in China have for decades been able to 
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manage their own affairs as long as they delivered economic expansion and minimized 
social conflict. However, recent events such as local officials in Henan and Shanxi 
provinces association with the owners of brick kilns and coal mines who kidnapped 
hundreds of children and adults and forced them to work in hash conditions, has 
illustrated local authorities tendencies to turn a blind eye to violations of safety, labor, 
and environmental standards. With the new Beijing initiatives the government aims to 
keep its word. The state land inspector general Mr. Xu Shaoshi’s top priority is to reduce 
the seizure of agricultural land for commercial development, which has caused an 
increase in mass incidents and social unrest. The shift to a stronger central authority may 
assist in bridging the growing urban-rural divide, decreasing often widespread corruption, 
and enforcing environmental standards. “Enforcement is the chief issue in solving 
China’s environmental problems, and the local level is the most important,” says Zhang 
Shaomin, a deputy director general at the State Environmental Protection Administration. 
The abolishment of an agriculture tax has pleased farmers and taken away a major source 
of income for local government officials, which were often abused. As long as the public 
perception of the top leadership in Beijing is basically honest and well-meaning, central 
control will work to improve China’s charm offensive.141  
Battling poor labor policies will be explored in the following section, but Beijing 
has begun taking corrective measures against those guilty of labor violations. The Beijing 
Olympic Organizing Committee has taken measures against four factories making 
Olympic merchandise while in violation of labor policies, namely child labor and 
excessive work hours. The incidents highlight the rising pressure Beijing has faced to 
improve its human rights record under increased international scrutiny in the run up to the 
2008 Olympic Games. The committee’s actions are in response to the Playfair Group, an 
international group of trade unions and nongovernmental organizations, which first raised 
these issues. One of the cited manufacturers, Mainland Headwear Holdings is a major 
supplier to Wal-Mart Stores, which issued a warning to them after finding that they 
overworked staff and violated labor laws, yet another indication of the rule of law bent 
for capital gain at the laborers’ expense, and Western companies with vocal shareholders 
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ability to maintain international standards.142 To maintain the attractiveness of the China 
model, Beijing must prevent poor labor policies and poor quality control to be exported 
from or exist within its own borders. As China is exposed more and more by foreign 
media these issues will be broadcasted, repealing the attraction of China and causing a 
decline in the effectiveness of the charm offensive. Therefore, it is of the utmost 
importance for Beijing to ensure it is correcting internal labor and product policies. 
China’s government funded economic programs are producing results and 
opportunities for other developing nations. The rapidly growing economy and thirst for 
energy resources has created a need for those developing nations with oil, gas, minerals, 
and other commodities to maximize their benefit. Developing countries in Latin America, 
Africa, and Southeast Asia have developed trade surpluses with China and potentially use 
the available capital to create stronger social, educational, and economic institutions. Not 
only do the surpluses allow for the creation of a higher standard of living, but also limits 
the possibility of a national debt, in addition to creating a larger demand for labor which 
may often be filled by locals who are able to raise their skill level or imported Chinese 
laborers who will bring more capital to a developing nation. Often cheap Chinese 
products are also welcomed by poorer consumers in developing nations who are not able 
to afford Western products.  
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the China model and the most positive aspect 
of the growing nation to be passed on to other developing nations is the ability of the 
central government and provincial governments to use enough of China’s wealth to lift 
hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. Beijing has enabled the state-dominated 
model of development to do considerable good for not just China but for neighboring 
states and other developing nations. 
B. NEGATIVE GLOBAL RESULTS AND THE ABSENCE OF CHARM 
VALUES 
China’s rising soft power parallels growth in concerns regarding the exportation 
of Beijing’s poor labor and human rights policies, environmental standards, health and 
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safety records, unsafe exports, economic suppression, and poor governance. What at one 
point were internal policy problems for the people of Shenzhen, Guangzhou, or Shenyang 
are now problems for people in Panama City, Khartoum, or Caracas. Nevertheless, in a 
flatter world, China’s influence may spread faster than that of traditional powers, like the 
United States and Japan. While much of the world has already formed an opinion on 
America’s policies, values, and culture, China remains a new entity outside of Asia. 
Although the international media covers China often, it does not attract the level of 
attention the United States draws, but as China gains power the world media will focus 
more on China’s critical faults which make up the foundation of the charm offensive, 
such as its values.  
China’s labor policies are certainly not known for their equal employment and fair 
treatment opportunities. Such policies when compared to that of the United States, a great 
power, highlight the charm offensive’s faults and demonstrate how much China must 
grow before becoming a great power. Most Chinese companies do not treat their 
employees well at home, and most developing nations lack the necessary tools to enforce 
labor rules on foreign operated companies. Further, Chinese companies have no 
experience working with independent unions. The All China Federation of Trade Unions, 
which is controlled by the Communist Party, controls all the unions within the country.143 
Not only do Chinese companies not understand labor laws, but also Chinese corporations 
rarely interact with nongovernmental organizations, activists, shareholder groups, and 
other influential groups. Whether incurring horrible safety records by simply not 
supplying basic safety equipment or enforcing weak environmental controls, China’s 
state owned companies are clearly not up to the standards of a great power and therefore 
perhaps only suited for the developing world.  
The Peruvian town of San Juan de Marcona offers a window into the labor and 
environmental problems China has exported to developing nations. In 1992, a Chinese 
state steel company, Shougang International Trade and Engineering, purchased Hierro de 
Peru, a state-run iron mine. The promised investment of $150 million was welcomed by 
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the state and the general population who hoped the local economy would be revitalized 
thanks to the Chinese. However, despite a rise in Shougang’s profits, little was done to 
improve the mine or its safety measures, spending only $35 million of the $150 million 
initially promised. The local population became concerned of serious environmental 
problems including the allegations of Shougang’s dumping of chemical waste into the 
nearby ocean. Finally, after receiving complaints of a pay freeze the Peruvian 
government investigated Shougang’s poor labor policies, environmental standards, and 
lack of safety measures. The government fined Shougang $14 million for failing to make 
necessary improvements to the mine, which was paid, but clearly paying the fines was 
cheaper than spending the money to make the needed upgrades. For four years between 
2001 and 2005 the workers at the mine protested wages and began to walk out of work 
due to continued environmental, labor, and safety issues. The results were not what the 
local population had aimed for as Shougang simply fired the labor force and imported 
their own laborers from China, who received no benefits at all, and only contributed to 
the problems between the Chinese company and Peruvian people.144 
China’s human rights policies are an aspect of a developing nation and far from 
that of a great power. The treatment of those involved in “mass incidents” or 
demonstrations highlight the government’s control and its lack of support for adequate 
human rights. In the southeast Chinese villages of Panlong and Dongzhou, police killings 
of protestors raise serious questions about China’s ability to contain unrest. The number 
of protests, officially called “mass incidents” has increased from 8,700 in 1993 to 74,000 
in 2004. Laborers enraged by massive layoffs, plundered pensions, confiscated land, and 
corrupt officials, seek the attention of senior Party leaders, thereby frightening local 
officials into making concessions.  
Meanwhile, Beijing attempts to persuade apolitical citizens that the Party can 
provide economic growth and clean autocracy. However, as the recent events in Chinese 
villages indicate this strategy from Beijing is not yet successful. Local officials punish 
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those who use the legal petitioning system and hire thugs instead of uniformed police to 
settle protestors. In January of 2006, 20 demonstrators in Dongzhou died after “warning 
shots” were fired, and a thirteen year old girl was beaten to death, which was 
unfortunately reported as a heart attack victim. In Zhejiang province in April of 2005 
police attempted to settle a group protesting chemical factories that were killing crops, 
causing stillbirths and turning local water “the color of soy sauce.” However, efforts left 
50 police wounded.145  
The treatment of “mass incidents” provides a window into the instability shaping 
Beijing’s responses to larger human rights issues. For example, Beijing’s organization of 
the Six Party Talks is in fear of instability and refugee flows in the northeast where 
protest rates are the highest. China’s inability to free up exchange rates due to fear of 
unemployment and unrest, Beijing’s fear of Muslim unrest in Central Asia has caused it 
to support repressive regimes, and the fear of how nationalist demonstrations might limit 
flexibility in easing tensions with Taiwan and Japan, all contribute to Beijing’s intensive 
human rights suppressions.146 
Environmental protection is nearly nonexistent in China. With a government 
focused on maintaining growth rates, few officials care about the environmental 
consequences of industrialization. As Elizabeth Economy has illustrated, Beijing has not 
demonstrated any commitment to river and wetland preservation within China. The 
foundation of China’s export economy, textiles, accounts for most the water 
contamination. Last year in Dongguan Chinese government investigators found a pipe 
buried underneath the factory floor of Fuan Textiles mill dumping roughly 22,000 tons of 
water contaminated from its dyeing operations each day into a nearby river.147  
Undoubtedly, the Yangtze River and other major waterways have been all but destroyed. 
Recalling Beijing’s refusal to join the Mekong River Commission and address concerns 
voiced from neighboring Cambodia regarding water flow, Beijing commissioned its own 
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environmental impact assessment of its dams that proceeded with a one day trip.148 
Though water levels have receded to leave behind flat plains, and Cambodia’s Tonle Sap, 
the largest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia, fed by the Mekong is drying up, the 
Chinese felt a day trip to the region would suffice to determine the environmental impacts 
of Beijing’s decision to dam upper portions of the Mekong River. Certainly a day trip to 
the region would not suffice in determining the environmental and ecological effects of 
the damming projects along the Mekong River, but in an effort to calm fears Beijing has 
promised to enforce environmental standards, which have yet to be demonstrated.  
Beijing often represses green activist groups further indicating its weak pro-
environmental policy. On China’s border with Burma, Chinese companies have 
decimated protected forests to supply the demand for housing in developing urban areas. 
In the north of Burma, Chinese companies have increased from four in 1984 to more than 
a hundred in 2005, resulting in stockpiles of timber, all of which are suspected to have 
been illegally harvested.149 Additionally, local leaders along the Burmese border have 
encouraged the cross-border cutting, despite China officially signing international bans 
on illegal logging. Beijing may have the best intentions to demonstrate itself as a 
responsible regional and global power by providing leadership advice to other timber 
importing countries, but China’s actions speak louder. It is estimated that 98 percent of 
Burma’s exports of timber to China come from illegal sources, such as protected forests, 
and that the revenue is funding low-intensity conflicts inside Burma. Burma is not the 
only supplier of illegal timber to China. Global Witness believes half of China’s imported 
timber comes from illegal sources as the importation of timber has tripled in the eight 
years between 1997 and 2005.150 In Indonesia the story is similar as China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation, a state-owned enterprise, and its Indonesian partner, Sinar Mas 
Agro, seek to invest $5 billion over eight years to develop palm-oil plantations in Papua 
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hoping to feed the demand for bio-diesel. The palm oil ventures result in the cutting and 
export of valuable hardwood and in the case of Papua, losing vital rain forest acreage, yet 
another Chinese venture that illustrates reckless disregard for the environment.151  
China’s behavior in the global fishing trade highlights the state’s disregard for the 
environment. Impoverished nations like Mauritania in West Africa sell their seas to 
nations that have over fished in their own waters. Local fishermen are forced to compete 
with huge trawlers from China who leases 99 of the 340 foreign boats licensed in 
Mauritania. China’s goal is to keep their fisherman on the water, providing $2 billion a 
year in fuel subsidies, boosting the number of work boats, increasing the global catch, 
and driving down fish prices, which makes it more difficult for Mauritian fishermen who 
receive no subsidies to compete. The result is African waters loosing stock rapidly, with 
ramifications both to the economies of Africa’s coastal nations and the world’s ocean 
ecology. Over the past thirty years the fish in West African waters have declined 50%. 
Rising fuel costs and low-cost Chinese competition has squeezed profits adding pressure 
to find waters where fish are more plentiful. In 2005 China, which catches more fish than 
any other nation, supplied two fighter jets as partial compensation for fishing rights in 
Mauritania.152 The exportation of China’s disregard for environmental concerns is clearly 
demonstrated in their relationship with Mauritania which receives no other benefits or aid 
from Beijing. 
To compound their environmental problems two-thirds of Chinese cities fail 
World Health Organization (WHO) standards for air quality, the worst rate of any large 
country and any seeking global power. Sixteen of the world’s 20 most polluted cities are 
in China.153 Specifically in Beijing, where authorities estimate a million tons of dust 
settles every year, the level of microscopic aerosols is seven times the public-health 
standard set by the WHO. The air pollution has begun to impact North America as well. 
An outpouring of dust layered with man-made sulfates, smog, industrial fumes, carbon 
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grit and nitrates cross the Pacific Ocean on prevailing winds from China’s economy in 
plumes which alter the climate in North America. Almost a third of the air over Los 
Angeles and San Francisco can be traced directly back to China, and with it comes up to 
three quarters of the black carbon particulate pollution produced by China.154 
Additionally, beyond the Burmese forests and the Cambodian Mekong River, China has 
further exported their unwillingness to conduct adequate environmental studies. China’s 
Export-Import Bank declines to sign environmental guidelines which are often required 
by Western countries, and as part of Beijing sponsored aid not only are contracts given to 
Chinese companies with their own laborers, but also environmental impact assessments 
are refused.155  
While China’s regulations may currently be changing regarding export safety and 
product standards, Mattel Inc.’s recall of more than one million lead-contaminated toys 
made in China illustrates how difficult it can be for businesses to benefit from low-priced 
goods without facing safety and regulatory risks. Mattel was one of the first American 
companies to move its manufacturing to China twenty years ago. Today, the city of 
Dongguan now has more than 5,000 toy factories, where the majority of the world’s toys 
are made. China’s manufacturers repeatedly revert to lead paint regardless of the rules 
because it is cheap and help factories meet relentless pressure to contain costs. Violations 
go unnoticed due to regulatory weaknesses and lackadaisical Chinese regulators. China 
currently has laws banning lead-paint from consumer products, but a lack of regulatory 
enforcement means such laws are obviously ignored.156 However, in recent news, Beijing 
has temporarily banned the exports of good produced by Lee Der Industrial, the producer 
of Mattel toys, which came days before the suicide of the head of the company Zhang 
Shuhong.157 Beijing’s imposition of an export ban is a step in the right direction until 
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safety and standard regulations can be properly implemented. Overall, as China is 
exposed more and more by foreign media these issues will be broadcasted, repealing the 
attraction of China and causing a decline in the effectiveness of the charm offensive. 
China’s ability to regulate what it exports is at the heart of Beijing’s governing 
problem. China may impose tougher rules, but actually implementing the export controls 
is a problem. Despite a United Nations sanction resolution on Iran in December of 2006, 
Beijing owned companies continue to export sensitive military technologies to Iran. The 
goods have included a range of specialty metals and other dual-use items that could aid 
Tehran’s missile and nuclear programs, with some cargoes going to Iran’s main ballistic 
missile producer. In this respect, Beijing is able to exercise limited control of the export 
of potential weapons materials to countries under international scrutiny. In a classified 
incident this year, Singaporean authorities were tipped off by U.S. intelligence agencies 
of a container transiting through its port from China en route to Iran. Large quantities of 
chemical compound used to make solid fuel for ballistic missiles were found, and 
intended for Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, which is responsible for Iran’s efforts to 
develop long-range missiles.158 The state-owned company China Great Wall Industry 
Corps was named as one of the providers of this technology, which is also interestingly 
linked to the Nigerian government who chose the firm to launch a new Nigerian 
satellite.159 Despite Beijing’s best efforts to control exports, this is a glaring example of 
its inability to monitor its own laws, agreed upon sanctions, and implement adequate 
oversight. Incidents such as this which are monitored by the international media can 
cause great decline in China’s soft power and the appeal of the China model.  
Beyond a complicated governing and enforcement problem, China has often 
disagreed with what is and what is not a health hazard. As Chinese authorities have 
recently banned the export of toothpaste containing diethyl glycol, a poisonous chemical 
used in automobile antifreeze, that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration deemed as a 
health hazard, China did not order a recall of millions of tubes still on store shelves 
across China. Beijing’s General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
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Quarantines has insisted that the levels of the poisonous chemical are safe and has told 
consumers not to be concerned citing a 2000 study by experts assembled by China’s 
Ministry of Health. The decision to stop exports but permit their sale throughout China 
till stocks are sold out underscores the fact that the people most at risk from China’s 
public health and safety lapses are the Chinese citizens. Chinese officials indicate they 
have yet to receive complaints of illness or death related to the chemical, but Beijing is 
still attempting to develop an effective nationwide reporting system of problems and 
illness related to consumer products. In the first half of this year, the Chinese government 
reviewed 114 types of products made for domestic consumption by more than 6,300 
companies, and found nearly a fifth failed quality and safety standards. In a survey 
conducted this year, Xinhua found 92% of respondents were “concerned about food 
safety” and 78% said they believed government enforcement of safety regulations is not 
satisfactory. Beijing’s efforts to police the problem are hampered by widespread 
corruption and the proliferation of small family manufacturers making multiple items, all 
overwhelming China’s inspection bureaucracy.160 Therefore, the transparency, 
governing, and enforcement difficulties faced by Beijing highlight the cracks in the 
charm offensive, causing a great decline in China’s soft power and the appeal of the 
China model.  
Despite recent importance placed on product-liability and product-recall the 
system is in its infant stage in China, with no government regulations for the recall of 
products other than cars. After recent events, rules for recalls of hazardous toys and 
unsafe food are expected by the end of the year. China’s product-safety issues stem form 
the Chinese private sector’s embrace of profits at nearly any cost, where companies 
decide to focus on the local market instead of exports due to lower standards and less 
enforcement. As for the toothpaste, the chemical was substituted for glycerin as its price 
increased and Chinese companies sought to maximize profits despite their knowledge of 
the toxic chemical, figuring since people do not ingest toothpaste, the risks to consumers 
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would be minimal.161 As safety fears continue to mount, brand protection will grow in 
importance, evident in Colgate’s warning to consumers about tainted toothpaste bearing 
counterfeit Colgate labels. Though easier for larger companies, small brands may only 
get one opportunity to maintain confidence with consumers. For publicly traded 
companies, the stock market will reflect China based quality control as investors will 
demand discounts if companies fail to reduce litigation risks and implement more 
stringent control guidelines. The likely result for lackadaisical Chinese officials is the 
harsh judgment of American business partners and their consumers.162 In this case, 
toothpaste is just one area where differing product-safety standards and levels of 
enforcement in China are raising concerns abroad about the potential hazards posed by 
less regulated Chinese exports. As reports of problems multiply, even in China’s tightly 
controlled press, the issues have caused a crisis of confidence among Chinese consumers, 
overseas consumers, and China’s ability to protect against such incidents. 
In the previous section, China’s economy was addressed as a land of opportunity 
for developing nations. However, China’s exports may threaten developing nations’ 
industries. In fact, Beijing is often seen as an unfair competitor due to its labor policies, 
dumping, undervaluation of its currency, and state support for certain industries. As is, 
China’s exports overlap by more than 50 percent with those from regional countries such 
as Thailand and the Philippines, and foreign investment in developing regions like Latin 
America which compete with China has sharply declined since the turn of the century. 
Despite China joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, it has displaced Mexico as 
the second-largest exporter to the United States and has begun to run large trade surpluses 
with its developing neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam.163 Seventy percent of China’s 
publicly traded companies are worthless, the banking system carries close to $1 trillion 
dollars in bad loans, and Premier Wen Jiabao has admitted the economy is “unbalanced, 
uncoordinated, and unstable.”164 However, as previously mentioned some developing 
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nations enjoy cheap Chinese products because they are unable to afford Western goods, 
but in the case of dumping low-quality and often pirated goods into the markets of Africa, 
Latin America, and Southeast Asia, these situations may potentially push developing 
nations and even first world nations away from trade with China. In fact, the United 
States Senate Finance Committee recently passed a bill that would open the way for 
punishing China over its monetary policy. The bill calls specifically for antidumping 
penalties if China fails to revalue its currency after it is identified as “fundamentally 
misaligned.” Beijing is suspected of keeping the Chinese Yuan artificially low, making 
its imports unfairly cheap and fueling its record trade surpluses.165  
Throughout Central and South America a few notable countries have begun to 
take action against China and their often unfair trading actions. Brazil and Argentina have 
expressed concern over rising imports from China that have not resulted in as dramatic an 
increase in exports. To counter, Brazil has imposed twenty antidumping clauses and 
Argentina has introduced new non-tariff barriers on Chinese imports. Both countries join 
a conglomerate of developing nations who have filled trade investigations against China. 
Despite press indicating European Union and United States actions against Chinese 
exports, two-thirds of trade investigations against China have originated by developing 
countries. However, recently the Bush administration asked the WTO to force China to 
crack down on pirated goods such as U.S. movies and software. Washington wants China 
to drop quantity thresholds, which are high enough that wholesalers and distributors can 
escape prosecution while selling pirated goods.166 Further, the decline in foreign 
investment in Latin America and the competition with the Chinese textile industries has 
enticed Ecuador to limit Chinese investment and is a fundamental reason why Central 
American nations signed a 2005 free trade agreement with the United States, hoping to 
keep some textile companies nearby and not in China.167 
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In Asia and Africa the situation is similar. Despite the “win-win” strategy, China 
has illustrated some measures of protectionism in their planned economy. Agricultural 
trade with neighboring Thailand and smaller textile companies, and manufacturers in 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Indonesia have found it difficult to enter the Chinese 
market due to high barriers of entry like value-added taxes. China’s protectionism 
extends to their resource grab as well. In developing African states, China is often seen as 
simply taking the energy resources and leaving low-quality products in a local market, 
often undercutting local products and not reciprocating trade by supporting a developing 
nation’s exports. Ironically, Beijing has recently accused the U.S. as overly protectionist 
and an uncooperative trading partner, urging Washington to loosen its high-technology 
export controls if it wants to pare its trade deficit with China.168  
Protectionism has caused China to illustrate little transparency and other aspects 
of good governance, despite their willingness to often share technology and conduct 
training and educational programs. Often Beijing’s third goal of the “win-win” strategy, 
to build a network of allies who share like concerns of nations intervening in other’s 
affair, means China’s state-led business model may undermine the rule of law. While 
Western operated companies are private and separated from their governments, Chinese 
companies do not operate under similar oversight. Western companies operating in China 
must therefore take drastic actions to sell their products in an often lawless economy. In 
an effort to combat rampant piracy Microsoft slashed the price of Windows Vista 
operating system by more than half in lure buyers away from pirated versions of the 
software. The price reduction seeks to spread legitimate Microsoft products in China and 
decrease the use of pirated software which was estimated at 82% last year.169 In a 
ranking of eighty nations’ adherence to corporate responsibility, China placed sixty-
sixth.170 Without proper oversight from shareholders, a board of directors, democratically 
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elected legislatures, and media Chinese companies will continue to operate with poor 
labor policies and horrendous environmental standards. 
Recently, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., run by the Sage of Omaha, Warren Buffett, 
cut its stake in PetroChina Company the largest listed Chinese oil and gas producer. 
Under pressure from shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Mr. Buffett divested itself of 
shares due to allegations that PetroChina indirectly provides financial support to the 
genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. Ironically, the reduction of shares was timed with 
a shocking and powerful full page ad in The Wall Street Journal by savedarfur.org 
indicating China is only publicizing its role in the Olympic Games and not the Darfur 
genocide. As Sudan’s chief diplomatic sponsor, major weapons provider, and largest 
foreign investor and trade partner, China has more power than any other nation to 
persuade Sudan to stop the genocide.171 Yet, without accepting responsibility, China has 
maintained their noninterference policy and strengthened economic and military ties. 
With the approaching Beijing Olympic Games Berkshire remains PetroChina’s second-
largest shareholder, but the selling of shares indicated a response to the allegations in an 
attempt to send a signal of the power shareholders hold to determine the actions of a 
company and western disapproval of China’s actions. Of no surprise the company’s 
largest holder is state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation which owns 
88.2%.172 The domination of stock owned by the Beijing indicates the inability of other 
shareholders to determine the company’s actions, furthering state-led business’ ability to 
undermine the rule of law.  
To maintain the attractiveness of the Chinese economic and political model, 
Beijing does have to constrain itself somewhat by the law. To this point, Beijing has 
prosecuted many white-collar criminals, including senior officials at the Bank of China, 
and others to attempt to illustrate their ability to the law. Most recently, Zheng Xiaoyu, 
the head of China’s State Food and Drug Administration was executed July 10th 2007 
                                                 
171 Unattributed. “Beijing Games, Darfur Genocide” The Wall Street Journal, 23 July 2007. 
172 Aries Poon. “Berkshire Hathaway Trims PetroChina Stake” The Wall Street Journal, 28 July 2007. 
 75
after convicted of accepting bribes from drug companies.173 Yet, in the most nascent of 
the developing nations in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia the rule of law, 
media, shareholders, board of directors and democratically elected legislatures do not 
exist. In these countries where leaders have no qualms about stealing and economic 
policy makers are not separated from politics, the state-dominated model of Chinese 
development may potentially be disastrous. Such a situation has invited Chinese 
companies to bribe the right individuals, adding to corrupt nations’ behavior and angering 
those who respect good governance, faulting China for its lack of ethical standards.  
Furthermore, Africa is by far the most apparent example of the potentially 
corrosive consequences of Chinese aid. Beijing’s often limitless supply of aid to 
autocratic regimes may lead the public to question whether or not China does not 
interfere with a nations’ affairs or not. Whether it is China’s relationship with Sudan or 
the Angolan government, the Chinese often offer aid with only the condition of using 
Chinese firms, much to the satisfaction of the developing states’ leaders who often hold 
disdain for Western policies. If China continues to use its influence to support elites or 
rebel groups, to the detriment of the general public, it is very clearly interfering with 
internal affairs.174   
China’s exportation of poor labor policies, environmental standards, health and 
safety records, economic suppression, and poor governance are rarely noticed due to 
China’s lack of individual rights, repressed freedoms, and a state-controlled media. 
Despite the international reach of Xinhua and its modern look to appeal to nations 
worldwide, it still feeds news back to Chinese publications and the Communist Party. 
However, today it is picked up in newspapers across the developing world and even in 
first world countries. Xinhua is therefore treated as a real news source though it is 
essentially a branch of the government and receives its guidance from the Party’s 
Publicity Department. Of course this produces the kind of news spin that every 
government would enjoy, producing few negative stories and only reporting on Beijing 
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and its policies in the most flattering and emulating light. Xinhua’s reporters receive 
training on the necessary role of the Communist Party, and in return provide an 
intelligence service for top Chinese leaders. “Xinhua remains at the heart of censorship 
and disinformation system established by the Chinese Communist Party.”175 This past 
spring, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television’s Propaganda 
Administration Department announced a ban on discussion whether the media should be 
free and imposed new regulations on performing artists and internet users to ensure the 
promotion of only a “healthy socialist culture.”176 Foreign journalists were allowed 
unfettered geographical access through the 2008 Olympics, but guidelines published soon 
thereafter forbid those journalists from reporting on corruption issues, legal reform, 
efforts by activists to protect human rights, and coverage of past political catastrophes in 
which the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre was so taboo it was not addressed in the meeting to 
decide what was taboo. In fact, ninety-five percent of foreign journalists in China think 
reporting conditions in the country do not meet international standards and sixty-eight 
percent believe Beijing has not lived up to its pledge of complete freedom to report.177  
Therefore, the troubling aspects of China’s labor, economic, environmental, and 
governance policies are difficult to find because of a lack of individual rights, free press, 
and a state-controlled media system.  
The exportation of China’s poor standards on labor issues, the environment, 
unfair trade agreements, and corporate governance has received the attention of many 
foreign opinion leaders and the general public, which could limit the effectiveness of the 
charm offensive. Whether it is underpaid workers, low safety standards, or potential 
environmental consequences of China’s demand for resources, activists and politicians 
alike are beginning to campaign against China’s actions. As China gains more power, the 
world media will focus more intensely on the inner problems of the PRC, decreasing the 
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effectiveness of Xinhua, the otherwise censor of China’s problems. Nations will see 
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VII. AMERICA’S SOFT SOFT POWER 
A. AMERICA’S SOFT POWER DECLINE 
China has certainly attempted to fill the void of America’s soft power decline in 
many regions of the world. In the 2005 BBC poll of twenty-two nations, not only did 48 
percent believe that China’s role in the world was mainly positive, but also only 38 
percent thought the United States had a positive influence on the world. These results 
placed the Untied States on the same tier as Russia, a current near-authoritarian regime 
run by KGB veterans.178 One year later, the 2006 BBC poll produced similar results and 
in some of the nations, Osama bin Laden received higher ratings than the United States, 
fairly shocking considering America is the world’s leading communications society.179  
In China, America’s soft power decline and China’s soft power rise are evident. 
In 1985 the Horizon Group asked Chinese citizens their views of the most prominent 
countries in the world, one-third ranked the United States most prominent and only 
thirteen percent chose China. Throughout the 1980’s and the early 1990’s, Chinese 
academics and students idolized the U.S. political system and tuned to Voice of America, 
long the flagship of U.S. broadcasting abroad, for their news. In the 1980’s some 70 
percent of Chinese university students trusted the Voice of America, and 75 percent 
distrusted the Chinese controlled media, all of which would shift in the 1990’s.180 After 
the Tiananmen Square incident, the Horizon Group returned in 2003 to poll the same 
questions as years earlier. The results showed nearly 40 percent of respondents picked 
China as the most prominent country in the world and the Untied States was placed 
second.181 Perhaps the decline of Chinese broadcasts of Voice of America 14 hours 
instead of 19 hours each day, decreasing the chances of reaching out and sharing 
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American public diplomacy, values, and culture is partially responsible for the decline in 
America’s attractiveness in China.182 Likewise, the noninterventionist policy of China 
contrasted to the interventionist policy of the United States contributes to the America’s 
popularity decline in China. 
China’s soft power rise does not necessarily depend upon America’s soft power 
decline. However, as America’s appeal continues to plummet the losses will contribute to 
China’s growing appeal, creating great gains for China’s charm offensive. Therefore, it is 
most important to understand why America’s soft power has recently declined. At the end 
of the Cold War there was no competitor in the world for soft power. Russia was 
preoccupied with itself attempting to discover capitalism and democracy at once, and 
China remained quiet and secluded in the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident. 
Democracy and capitalism were spreading throughout the world, and leaders of newly 
democratic countries looked to the United States for leadership. Likewise, American 
companies dominated the information technology revolution, boosting the U.S. economy 
and placing American businesses at the leading edge of the twentieth century. American 
music, film, and media dominated markets in regions all over the world, and the English 
language was quickly becoming the international language. However, with the Cold War 
won, America’s soft power was at its peak and a shift in foreign policy began its decline.  
 America had spent the entire Cold War building reservoirs of goodwill all over 
the world, serving as a beacon of morality, democracy, and capitalism. The United States 
had developed the United Nations to integrate itself with the world and to create a 
multilateral order in trade, aid, and diplomacy. However, in the 1990’s Washington began 
to look inward and ignore many of the world’s problems, never taking advantage of the 
goodwill it had amassed through the world or the multilateral organizations it had built. 
This change in foreign policy greatly affected the programs that had contributed to 
America’s victory in the Cold War. The White House and Congress decreased funding 
for foreign affairs from more than $5 billion in 1994 to $3.64 billion in 2000. During the 
same period, the State Department could only afford to replace 53 percent of its staff lost 
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through retirement, resignation, and other means of separation.183 U.S. public diplomacy 
and its associated programs designed to influence public opinion abroad received a 
decrease in funding. International exchanges which introduced future foreign leaders to 
the United States, and libraries and American Centers operated by the United States 
Information Agency (USIA) which provided foreigners a window into American culture 
were severely decreased. Eventually, the USIA was merged with the new undersecretary 
for public diplomacy at the State Department and its libraries were closed as many other 
means of broadcasting American trends to foreign audiences including sponsored tours 
by artists and musicians were decreased. In the four years between 2001 and 2005, the 
undersecretary for public diplomacy was filled on an interim basis for two years, 
spending only $1.2 billion on important broadcasts, exchanges, visa programs, scientific 
and technological cooperation, and development assistance; 450 times less than what 
America spends on hard power.184 Not surprisingly, State Department funding for 
educational and cultural exchange programs declined each year between 1993 and 2002 
and by the late 1990’s the USIA, the main outlet of public diplomacy had half as much 
staff as it had in the 1960’s.185   
 Washington’s leaders also focused inward and turned away from the multilateral 
organizations it had created, portraying the image of the United States as a unilateral 
actor. The United States failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal 
Court, and President Clinton never pushed for their ratification. The shift to unilateralism 
was a clear indication that the United States would no longer support the multilateral 
institution it had assisted in creating. More significantly, the Clinton administration 
refused to intervene in the genocide in Rwanda, undermining America’s credibility as a 
moral actor, and did not respond quickly to the financial meltdown in Thailand. These 
slow responses created an image of the Untied States as unwilling to provide to the world 
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in great crisis, or lead as a moral leader. To contribute to the image of America’s inward 
focus, as democracy and capitalism swept through developing areas of the world such as 
Latin America and Africa, Washington failed to welcome and embrace the newly 
empowered leaders. Democracy and capitalism, the two important entities the United 
States pushed for since the end of the Second World War, had been achieved, yet 
Washington never attempted to gain the trust of the new actors, and should have 
leveraged the fact that America’s promotion of democracy had assisted in their 
empowerment. At home in the United States, the retreat from global affairs appealed to 
most of the American public. Polls taken in 1993 and 1997 revealed that seven out of 
eight people thought that the United States should not be the globe’s sole leader.186 
Clearly the Clinton Administration agreed in terms of group leadership, and soon a global 
Americanization grew, breeding wide resentment.  
 America’s cultural and corporate power grew unchallenged in the 1990’s and 
many citizens of developing nations viewed American-led globalization as a threat to 
their societies and identities. As Washington ignored concerns that U.S. film, media, and 
products would overwhelm local industries, America’s free trade initiatives fostered 
anger abroad. Free market capitalism failed to deliver strong growth to developing 
nations and the 1990’s turned into a period of disappointment as the free markets led to 
rampant corruption and unfulfilled expectations in developing nations and emerging 
markets.  By the end of the decade the United States had never fully taken advantage of 
the goodwill it had amassed for the previous five decades and foreigners no longer took 
notice of U.S. aid. The image of the United States as a promised land, distant, exotic, and 
glamorous had faded. Instead, the fear of American-led globalization, Americanization, 
had spread rampantly resulting in violent anti-U.S. and anti-globalization protests at the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank, all 
multilateral organizations the United States had built during the Cold War, and turned 
away from in the 1990’s as it  focused inward. 
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In the early 1980’s many countries criticized Washington’s decisions and 
policymakers, but American culture, companies, and people remained popular. In a 1983 
Gallup poll many Europeans illustrated disdain for President Reagan’s policies, but 
approved of the American way of life.187 However, the end of the Cold War marked the 
peak of American soft power and since the decline has continued. The decline has 
continued since 2001 and 2003 with the invasion of Iraq to the point that dislike for 
American policy has carried over into dislike of American culture, people, companies, 
and even American values. In a 2002 poll of forty-three nations, majorities of people in 
thirty-four nations were not pleased with the growing influence of America, not just 
American policy. In a similar study, large percentages of respondent in eighteen nations 
had a declining view of American people between 2002 and 2005.188 America’s values 
and sense as the land of opportunity has declined, reflected in a 2005 Pew study of people 
from sixteen countries, in which respondents were asked where to send a young man to 
lead a good life. America was not even in the top five. American brands have also 
decreased as a study by Anholt-GMI found that the United States ranked eleventh overall 
in terms of its cultural, political, popular, and business attractiveness.189 Specifically, 
these declining trends have been caused by America’s shift in the aftermath of 2001,   
from the selective interventionism of the 1990’s to intense engagement with the world, 
often alienating former friends, and raising concerns of Washington’s excessive 
involvement in other nation’s affairs.  
September 11 required tougher security measures which have made it more 
difficult for foreigners to obtain American student, work, and tourist visas, all of which 
were necessary, but alienated foreigners in the process. Visa costs quintupled between 
1998 and 2004, new security restrictions slowed reviews of visa applications, and refusal 
rates have increased dramatically between 2000 and 2003.190 In 2003, the number of 
foreign students at American universities fell for the first time since 1971, detrimental to 
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America’s soft power as foreign students return home carrying American ideas, values, 
and culture. These students add to America’s soft power and as Secretary of State Colin 
Powell said at the time, “I can think of no more valuable asset to our country than the 
friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here.”191 Equally importantly, 
the White House has made significant mistakes in public diplomacy, including failing to 
develop an effective public diplomacy strategy understanding that information is power, 
and today a much larger part of the world’s population has access to it. Technological 
advances have led to an information explosion where rumor and anti-American sentiment 
can spread around the world instantly; publics are sensitized to propaganda, increasing 
the need for solid credibility increasing U.S. diplomats need to promote America’s appeal 
and values.”192  
The Bush administration has attempted to revive the Foreign Service and foreign 
aid. Secretary of State Rice developed the Millennium Challenge Corporation to deliver 
aid to well-governed developing nations, demonstrating to emerging markets that 
America had returned to the aid game. Additionally, Secretary Rice shifted more than one 
hundred Foreign Service officers away from overstaffed and comfortable posts in Europe 
to developing countries where they are much needed. She has also sought to reopen many 
one-person Foreign Service missions in the developing world, extending the American 
government’s presence. However, the war on terrorism has stretched the Foreign Service 
thin with large missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other hotspots in the war on terror, to 
the point that the United States lacked an ambassador in Australia for eighteen months 
(2004-2006) and agents will be continuously impeded by security measures which will 
put them at an increasing disadvantage compared with diplomats from countries not 
threatened by terrorism.193   
Washington’s focus on terrorism since September 11th adds to potential alienation 
overseas. In only a small number of countries does the threat of terrorism exist, and to the 
remaining developing nations of the world, one focus by the world’s superpower, which 
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ought to be able to focus on many issues at once, appears unwise. Such an example is 
found during the meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group in 
Chile in 2004, in which President Bush focused on counterterrorism cooperation and 
weapons of mass destruction, despite APEC’s natural inclination to focus on issues of 
economics and business.194 The president’s comments and focus alienates many foreign 
leaders, calls into question why the United States cannot fully use its multilateral 
organizations to balance many issues at once, and illustrates Washington’s distraction 
from other major developments in the world today such as the rise of China’s soft power.  
Worse than Washington’s indifference towards multilateral organizations, and 
extreme focus on the war on terror, are the potential abuses at Guantanamo Bay, 
undermining the attractiveness of America as a leader of human dignity and human 
rights. These excesses detract from America’s values and weaken our ability to promote 
democracy and human rights abroad, as developing nations are able to highlight 
America’s hypocritical actions. China’s annual repot on America’s human rights record 
used to simply point out income disparity in America, but in the 2005 report made a 
larger statement, “In 2004 the atrocity of U.S. troops abusing Iraqi POWs exposed the 
dark side of human rights performance of the United States…the scandal shocked 
humanity and was condemned by the international community.”195 Clearly, China is 
attempting to direct the international spotlight away from its own human rights violations 
and highlight the few that exist within the United States, thereby decreasing America’s 
soft power.  
A freer and more capable international media has magnified Washington’s 
mistakes and America’s faults, such as the Hurricane Katrina debacle or the controversy 
over the 2000 presidential election. Satellite television stations such as Al Jazeera, which 
tends to be critical of the United States and the expanding access to the internet, have 
spread through the developing nations of the world. These media outlets have made the 
White House’s actions instantly accessible to people around the world and assisted in 
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making American policy as unpopular as at any point in modern history. The Anti-
Americanism has spread to our allies, such as a recent poll of South Korea indicates. 
Roughly half of young South Koreans surveyed indicated their nation should support 
North Korea if Pyongyang and Washington went to war. Only 11.6 percent thought that 
South Korea should support America in the same conflict.196 America’s unpopularity has 
continued with the decline of international graduate school applications to U.S. 
universities, which decreased 28 percent between 2003 and 2004, the first decline in 
more than three decades. Granted part of this decline is attributable to the State 
Department’s increase in security measures, but a further drop of 5 percent between 2004 
and 2005 indicates that America’s overall attractiveness has certainly declined.197  
The unpopularity of the United States matters a great deal. Despite China’s rise in 
attractiveness and the overall effectiveness of its charm offensive, the decrease in 
Washington’s soft power, potentially forces the United States to resort to hard power 
means of persuasion to meet American objectives. Without soft power, the United States 
will have to resort to relying on military force to protect U.S. national interests and find 
itself in a position where it cannot recover its soft power due to the overuse of its 
military. Since the war in Iraq, Americans are unloved, and Washington has failed to 
understand why democratization in Africa, Latin America, and Asia has changed 
international relations. Many leaders of democracies have felt unable to support the 
United States; simply because Washington failed to use the multilateral organizations it 
created to fight the war on terror. Instead a ‘go it alone’ approach has alienated other 
democracies and even those plagued with terrorism in their country, such as Indonesia, 
highlighted by the 2002 Bali bombing, refuses to cooperate with Washington. Unlike the 
past when the people of a democratic country who loved and supported the United States 
would support their leader to join efforts with Washington, the decline in America’s soft 
power has enabled democratically elected leaders to ignore Washington’s requests. 
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Mexico, Chile, and Turkey did just that in the votes at the United Nations to endorse war 
against Iraq, and Turkey further refused to provide a base for the invasion causing no 
initial U.S. troop presence in northern Iraq.  
America has yet to restore its popularity throughout the world. The flawed 
interventionism of the 1990’s promoted by the Clinton administration set the stage for 
America’s declining soft power, essentially ignoring the developing nations of the world. 
However, the post – 9/11 reengagement of the world in the twenty-first century is a step 
in the right direction, but it is carried out through unilateral action and public diplomacy 
that does not win the ear of the developing world. However, this is not the end of 
America’s soft power, as the democratic values, individual liberties, and the American 
dream remain attractive to many overseas. America needs to draw upon these strengths to 
counter the Chinese charm offensive. In some cases America has done this well recently 
through its response to the tsunami in Indonesia, deployments of the USNS Comfort to 
Central and South America, the USNS Mercy to Southeast Asia for a return deployment 
in the wake of the tsunami, and the use of the USS Emory S. Land in its travels 
throughout Western Africa.198 However, America’s use of its soft power needs to extend 
beyond its military and until Washington begins to use its inherent strengths as it did for 
the five decades of the Cold War, Beijing will be able to wield its soft power to push 
against American power and potentially threaten American interests.   
B. HOW CHINA’S SOFT POWER WILL ASSIST GLOBAL STABILITY 
China’s soft power has often benefited the United States where Chinese and 
American interests coincide. In Central Asia, Beijing has used the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, a multilateral organization focused on Central Asia, to prod the Central 
Asia governments to assist with counter-terrorism efforts, promote regional economic 
cooperation, and be a growing market for consumer goods. In a sign of increasing 
engagement with the United Nations, Beijing sent one thousand peacekeeping troops to 
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southern Lebanon after the Israel-Hezbollah war.199 Despite its often ungoverned aid to 
countries like Sudan, China is attempting to work with other aid donors such that its own 
assistance does not interfere with that of the World Bank or the International Monetary 
Fund. China has strived to improve its transparency in aid donation and considered the 
establishment of a permanent aid bureaucracy similar to that of the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID).200 Such an action will certainly make the 
Chinese more accountable for their disbursement of aid and break the link between 
immediate political and economic needs with the supply of government funded programs.  
Beijing may be warming to the idea that supporting authoritarian regimes can 
foster instability and perhaps in the long run will adversely affect China. Recent actions 
along the Chinese-Burmese border to fight narcotics, decrease human trafficking, and 
eliminate gambling illustrate Beijing’s eagerness for Burma to reconcile its domestic 
disputes. China has even placed Burma’s human rights crisis on the agenda for the UN 
Security Council, all of which are bold moves for a state dedicated to forming a circle of 
allies who do not involve themselves in another nation’s affairs.201  
In matters in which the United States has little influence, China’s assistance 
creates the image that all pressures are not purely American initiatives. China is 
especially likely to employ this example when Beijing fears that instability in another 
nation could spill over into China, such as in the case of Burma, Central Asia, and 
especially North Korea. Beijing has long desired a leading role in the region, and now it 
can have it in regards to the DPRK and the responsibility for success as well. Allowing 
China to create the conditions for a peaceful resolution will push it firmly into a 
multilateral stance vis-à-vis its neighbors. The demands on President Hu Jintao not to 
have Chinese dignity besmirched by Kim Jong Il will help ensure a realistic proposal 
from China and allow an agreement to be settled upon. With Japanese and South Korean 
support, such a Chinese role may allow regional security mechanisms, such as the East 
Asian Community to move forward, reducing the chances of similar crises in the future. 
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For Washington, there are few proposals short of force to end Pyongyang’s weapons 
programs. However, recent bilateral negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang 
have resulted in North Korea’s agreement to declare and disable all nuclear facilities by 
the end of the year. Nevertheless, a successful maneuvering of China into the central role 
in this crisis will be the truest test of Washington’s leadership.202  
Likewise, China’s soft power has enabled a growing market for developing 
nations’ commodities, more so than the United States. China has allowed African, Asian, 
and Latin American nations to amass large trade balances to partially pay off some of the 
debt created during the 1990’s and reduce the risk of financial instability. In this manner, 
China has drawn a great deal of attention away from U.S. firms operating in Latin 
America as these firms address their own obstacles to economic competitiveness in fear 
of loosing foreign direct investment to China. In Africa, China is having the same effect, 
which has spread to Southeast Asia as well, forcing countries to operate more efficiently 
and through better business practices to ensure they receive foreign direct investment and 
not loose everything to China.  
C. HOW CHINA’S SOFT POWER WILL THREATEN GLOBAL STABILITY  
China’s increasing soft power is already having a strategic impact on U.S. foreign 
policy. Competing American and Chinese demands for energy may eventually lead to a 
clash over resources. As discussed earlier, China has enjoyed a great deal of success 
winning access to oil and gas through its state-run firms. Beijing will ensure China has 
secured resources throughout Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia as its economy 
continues to grow. In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez has announced plans to double 
oil exports to China, and build a shipping fleet making an investment in long-term growth 
in exports to China. Coincidentally, China’s state-owned firm Sinopec is planning to 
upgrade a pipeline from Venezuela through Panama and to the Pacific, orienting 
Venezuela toward China.203 Venezuela may lead the path for other Latin American 
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countries to shift resources to China and away from the United States. If this is the case 
the Chinese military may find itself in Latin America to ensure China’s resources are 
protected and secured. Such an event would ensure a closer relationship between the 
People’s Liberation Army and many Latin American militaries, and directly threaten the 
United States. A similar situation is unfolding in Nigeria, America’s fifth largest supplier 
of oil, as China was granted $4 billion worth of preferential Nigerian exploration rights 
and has gained leverage with its noninterference policy. As China is more in direct 
conflict with America’s need for vital resources, such events may lead to a clash over 
resources between Washington and Beijing. 
China’s soft power may also force countries to decide between Washington and 
Beijing. China’s benign image has made other countries feel more comfortable 
establishing closer ties to Beijing and nations in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are 
using Beijing as a hedge against America’s soft power. China has supported nations such 
as Uzbekistan to decrease formal ties with the United States and is pushing against 
American power in Asia, evident in multilateral forums such as the East Asia Summit 
which excludes the United States. It is possible that increased military operations 
between China and Thailand and the Philippines could continue to pull China into a 
position where it can push both countries to distance their close relations with the United 
States. As previously discussed Beijing’s ability to encourage nations to formally 
renounce Taipei and establish official ties with Beijing is successful. If this continues to 
gain momentum, and Taiwan is left unrecognized by the world’s majority, Beijing may 
strike at the island in an effort to reunify. Such an action would cause Asian nations to 
choose between Beijing and Washington, and at the moment Beijing may be gaining the 
upper-hand.    
China may possibly seek to push America’s closest allies to choose between 
Beijing and Washington. For five decades Australia and the United States have been 
allied via the ANZUS treaty. However, during an October 2003 visit to Australia, 
President Bush witnessed a great deal of anti-Americanism, an interruption of his address 
to the Australian Parliament, and more greetings of disapproval than approval. Days later, 
Chinese president Hu Jintao became the first Asian leader to address Australia’s 
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Parliament and received a warm welcome compared to President Bush, partially because 
of China’s industrial rise which has created an economic boom for the region. Prior to 
Hu’s departure China and Australia signed the framework for a future free trade 
agreement. Most recently, Bush’s visit to Sydney for the APEC forum has put much of 
the city in lockdown such that local papers dubbed the city ‘Fortress Sydney.’ Large scale 
demonstrations including one organized by the Stop Bush Coalition was planned for 
President Bush’s final day in Sydney.204 Australia’s responses to the Hu and Bush visits 
represent a shift in Australian public opinion as perhaps Australians feel as if their 
interests are diverging from those of America. Captured in the 2005 poll by Australian 
research organization the Lowy Institute, in which half the Australians surveyed had 
positive feelings about the United States, 57 percent viewed America’s foreign policies as 
a potential threat, 70 percent viewed China positively, greater than 50 percent supported a 
free trade agreement with China, while only 32 percent supported such a pact with the 
United States.205 China has aggressively sought to win Australia, increasing cultural 
exchanges, sending large diplomatic corps for official visits, extending their hand for a 
strategic partnership, and promoting the importance of China’s demand for natural 
resources to the Australian economy. Effectively, China is Australia’s second-largest 
trading partner and the Australian mining sector is booming, receiving a great deal of 
media coverage, portraying China’s benign image.  
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of China’s charm offensive to not only the 
world, but also to American influence, is Beijing’s wooing of countries such as Iran, 
Uzbekistan, and Sudan. All three are rigid authoritarian regimes, with little respect for 
human rights, and have bought China’s model of controlled development and no political 
change. Despite China’s advancements since 1978, Beijing remains an authoritarian 
country, with unfulfilled promises of political reform and individual freedoms. China’s 
central government places strict limits on people’s religious practice and government 
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employees and students are not allowed to worship the religion of their choice.206 In 
many ways, China is opening its economy, but not moving forward with any political 
change, especially in its ways to continue to support strict authoritarian regimes. Granted 
Beijing’s support for these strict regimes stems from its noninterference policy, which 
runs contrary to American foreign policy. Though Washington and Beijing agree on a 
few issues, generally the United States and China do not agree on how diplomacy and 
international affairs should be conducted. Beijing may be persuaded to support better 
governance along its borders, such as in Burma and North Korea, countries with limited 
resources and regimes which potentially spread instability in China. However, it is much 
more difficult to persuade China to act against strict authoritarian regimes with resources 
such as Iran, Uzbekistan, and Sudan or whose policies have no direct impact on China 
itself. In the decades to come the disagreement in how international affairs are to be 
conducted, the tightening of resources around the world, and as China’s support by its 
allies grows through its global soft power, conflict between Beijing and Washington is 
likely.   
Not only are the citizens of the authoritarian regimes suffering from China’s 
influence, but also China’s support for dictators damages American interests. China’s 
support for Iran, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela to name a few makes Washington 
look weak and reduces pressure on these unstable actors. China’s support of the genocide 
in Sudan illustrates the difficulties the United States as the world’s only superpower has 
dealt with to attempt to end the genocide. In Venezuela, Beijing’s ties increase Chavez’s 
regional support and cause. In Iran, China has prolonged the Iranian nuclear stalemate by 
reducing pressure on the dangerous state, making America’s and the European Union’s 
efforts more difficult, and increasing the likelihood of Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. 
In these examples, Beijing weakens Washington’s global influence and forces America to 
speak loudly but carry a small stick with not enough influence to persuade enough 
nations to support its pressure on dangerous authoritarian regimes. Hopefully in the near 
term Beijing will realize the dangers of associating itself with countries like Sudan, Iran,  
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and Venezuela without interfering with their domestic policies. If these countries ever 
made progress towards democracy, Beijing could face sizable backlash for its past 
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VIII. AMERICA’S RESPONSE 
China has demonstrated that it can effectively charm developing countries, often 
focusing on those America has alienated in the recent years. In such a process, China also 
portrays a benign image of itself. As Beijing seeks to develop China-centered spheres of 
influence around the world, it has brought longtime American allies such as Australia 
closer. However, China’s soft power does not yet approach that of the United States. 
Washington will continue to remain the essential power in world affairs. “When it comes 
to soft power, it will take much longer before it can make an impact close to what the 
U.S. enjoy now.”207 America will likely regain its appeal and rebuild its soft power just 
as it has in the past. However, U.S. policymakers need to critically observe and 
understand how China exerts soft power, that China’s soft power is dangerous to 
developing nations, and that elements of China’s charm offensive seek hard power 
objectives which will threaten U.S. interests.208  Washington must respond accordingly. 
The United States remains the world’s unchallenged military power, which does 
not necessarily ensure soft influence, but can complement soft power tremendously. 
Military power deployed for humanitarian missions such as the 2004 tsunami relief in 
Indonesia, improves a nation’s popularity. The tsunami efforts demonstrated that only the 
United States has the capabilities to move aid overnight to any region of the world. The 
American public diplomacy efforts were highlighted by a sharp decline in a survey of 
Indonesians in January 2006 which found that unfavorable views of America had 
dropped from 48 percent in 2004 to 13 percent.209 Indeed, America and Indonesia are 
closer since the tsunami and through return visits of American naval assets and the USNS 
Mercy, relations are improving.   
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America’s military power, blue-water navy, basing agreements around the world, 
and rapid reaction forces make the United States a prime choice as a security partner. 
America is the only nation in the world which can act as a global policeman especially 
when supported by the very multilateral organizations it created. The United States’ 
economic power is also far beyond the reach of any other. By the numbers China still 
remains a developing country with a very low gross domestic product per capita, as 
America’s continues to increase. Current American investment in developing countries is 
higher than that of China. Also America remains the land of innovation for science and 
technology, therefore, is seen as a favorable economic partner over China. 
Despite the popularity increase in Chinese-language studies and cultural institutes, 
American culture remains in the lead. The United States is the largest source of film, 
media, television, music, art, and literature. The American university system is 
unmatched throughout the world and foreigners still want to study in the United States, 
despite declining application numbers which mostly reflects new security measures put in 
place after September 11th. China does not have cultural industries like Hollywood and it 
lacks the many non-governmental organizations that generate much of America’s soft 
power. Most importantly American values, political model, and social model appeal to 
people throughout the world. Politically, China suffers from corruption, inequality, and a 
lack of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. While China’s noninterference 
policy, economic directed growth by the state, and respect for other nation’s internal 
affairs do enjoy some appeal by authoritarian regimes it undercuts China’s soft power in 
the West. 210 China is simply unable to offer the values that America does. A free, rights-
oriented political system and economy is the vision of the future for the globalized world, 
yet China has failed to offer this perspective as communism remains the political system 
of choice in Beijing. 
China currently faces serious problems as to how to continue to build its soft 
power. Recent international media has highlighted the difficulties and flaws of China’s 
domestic economic system and the associated exports. China’s exportation of labor, 
                                                 
210 Joseph S. Nye Jr. “The Rise of China’s Soft Power” The Asian Wall Street Journal, 29 December 
2005.  
 97
environmental, and governance problems alienate the citizens of Latin American, 
African, and Southeast Asian nations. Promises of aid and investment may take years to 
materialize, though Beijing has increased expectations about its potential as a donor and 
investor as part of the “win-win” strategy. Beijing’s noninterference policy and support 
for autocratic rulers has caught the eye of the international public, causing international 
criticism and more media attention. However, Beijing cannot simply step away from its 
noninterference policy and “win-win” strategy without raising fears of China’s intentions 
to meddle in other nation’s affairs, and therefore weakening the benign image it has 
portrayed. Additionally, China cannot use the multilateral organizations it has created or 
is associated with as a facade for its hard power objectives. Any decision by Beijing that 
may appear arrogant or indicate Chinese dominance may cause severe backlash, as the 
multilateral organizations serve as a means for smaller states to restrain China’s regional 
dominance. China’s trade relations could limit their soft power if it continues to build 
surpluses with the developing world. To the states in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin 
America, Beijing could quickly resemble the colonial powers who took the resources 
they needed doing little to improve the host nation, yet leaving behind larger labor, 
environmental, and governance problems. While China’s culture provides some soft 
power, Beijing’s domestic policies and values set limits, where fears arise in allowing too 
much intellectual freedom and outside influence.211  
Washington is the obvious choice for developing nations to turn to when relations 
with Beijing head south. In this respect, the United States must be prepared to leverage 
Beijing’s charm on issues of interest to both China and Washington, while rebuilding 
America’s soft power to counter China on issues where the two states’ interests diverge. 
Therefore, America must understand how China exerts its soft power. To gain and build 
this comprehension, Washington must create more American missions in China, and 
apply its Cold War strategy of employing at least one person at each embassy to study 
what the Chinese are doing in terms of aid, investment, public diplomacy, and all hard 
and soft power aspects in that country each day. With a better understanding of China’s 
soft power, Washington can determine where Beijing’s soft power threatens American 
                                                 
211 Nye. Soft Power, 89. 
 98
interests. Such interests include other nation’s territorial integrity, support for America in 
conflicts world-wide, control of sea lanes, access to resources, formal alliances with 
foreign nations, and the promotion of democracy and good governance. 
In the event of global economic problems to include recession and depression the 
world will look to America and China. If the problems originate in China, the China 
model and associated soft power will decline, as the eyes of the world turn to America for 
assistance. However, if America is to blame for a global recession, China will reap the 
benefits and American soft power will continue to decline. Well managed fiscal and 
monetary policies by both China and the United States will prevent such a global 
economic problem, especially as the two countries become more economically entwined. 
If ever there was to be a problem, chances are it will originate from the Chinese market, 
calling for the United States to assist either directly or through its multilateral 
organizations such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund, bolstering 
America’s soft power and the appeal of a country whose values, culture, and public 
diplomacy resonate with most of the world.  
Rebuilding America’s soft power will require a clear and concise national public 
diplomacy strategy. The appointment of an internationally known figure as the U.S. 
public diplomacy czar will enable greater reach to elites and the average public abroad. 
The budget declines of the 1990’s will have to be recovered to provide increased cultural 
exchanges, strengthen the Voice of America, reestablish many lost American library 
facilities and cultural programs, and streamline the visa processing system while 
incorporating new security measures to prevent the alienation of foreign travelers. 
Broadcasting America’s image, culture, values, and public diplomacy requires that of a 
fair reporting outlet. Whether this is the use of Voice of America or the support of 
independent or foreign media organizations who report on the United States, it is 
important to allow the free speech of the media and accept a few criticisms when 
deserved. Providing counter-terrorism programs in addition to much needed social and 
economic development to many parts of the developing world produces a surge in soft 
power. A study of public perceptions of America in Morocco and Indonesia found that 
when locals learned about specific U.S. assistance programs, America was viewed more 
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positively.212 Likewise, ensuring recipient nations receive the appropriate aid will 
increase America’s soft power. The recognition that American assistance must be 
provided to local organizations within countries rather than U.S. aid groups or businesses 
will greatly distinguish American assistance from Chinese aid linked to contracts for 
Chinese firms. Also it may be important to ensure that the citizens of those countries are 
informed about such aid programs from the U.S.  
Washington can learn a great deal from Beijing in rebuilding its public 
diplomacy. China has encouraged its diplomats to return to one nation for multiple tours 
and to learn local languages. However, since the U.S. Foreign Service cannot force repeat 
assignments to one nation, it can encourage return visits through incentive programs, 
whether financial or otherwise, and promote officers to focus on one region of the world 
greatly increasing the effectiveness of diplomats. Increased language skills would not 
only allow diplomats to speak with more of the country they are assigned to, but also 
provide a sense of commitment to the recipient state. In China’s formal diplomacy it 
generally brings cabinet-level officials, a lesson Washington could learn by ensuring 
more members of government venture outside America more often. Likewise, during 
visits overseas, perhaps leaving the American agenda aside occasionally and simply 
listening to other countries’ concerns would be of great value. “When we don’t talk to 
people and listen, even our enemies, that makes us look arrogant, rather than humble” 
says Joseph Nye.213 America must illustrate its desire to learn more from the world, 
remain humble, listen more often, build trust with many, and engage with regional groups 
and the multilateral organizations it developed reservoirs of goodwill with after the 
Second World War.  
Aside from the increase in public and formal diplomacy practices, American 
policies must improve. Washington must put aside its unilateral actions and ‘go it alone’ 
approach and return to the multilateral institutions it created, to rectify the American 
bully image. “The costs of a unilateral, we are the big guy, we will do it our way policy is 
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very expensive…people are less willing to do what we want.”214 While this does not 
mean supporting multilateral organizations which may limit American sovereignty it does 
call for supporting the modern international system Washington is responsible for. 
Certainly developing nations want to follow America’s lead and see America involved in 
the world. Most are able to accomplish this through participation in multilateral 
organizations that the United States is a member of, taking advantage of opportunities to 
interact and promote America as a symbol of economic freedom, individual liberties, and 
a country committed to economic prosperity. 
In a post-Iraq War and in a well-connected world, America must succeed in 
broadcasting its story. Success no longer depends on whose army wins, but rather which 
story wins. Credibility has become a contest and governments compete with each other 
and other organizations to enhance their own credibility and weaken that of their 
opponents. America needs more strategic communication to bolster its credibility and its 
story to increase its soft power which is of the utmost importance to achieve the 
promotion of democracy and human rights. Coercive diplomacy has its limits, as the 
Bush administration has found in Iraq. Therefore, America needs to employ a strategy 
post-Iraq War for how the government should relate to non-official generators of soft 
power, everything from Hollywood to Harvard to the Gates Foundation, that emanate 
from American civil society in addition to creating sound strategic communication and a 
strategy to employ soft power.215 Washington needs to recognize the importance of both 
hard and soft power, and debate a strategy at integrating them into everyday public 
diplomacy, government operations, foreign policy, and American culture and values.  
Most importantly, America’s core values continue to resonate with the rest of the 
world. A free, rights-oriented political system attracts not only the average person in an 
autocratic society, but also the elite of democratic societies. For example, in explaining a 
new movement toward using lawsuits to assert rights in China, a young Chinese activist 
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explained, “We’ve seen a lot of Hollywood movies that feature going to court. So now 
we think it’s only natural to go to court a few times in your life.” If American objectives 
include the strengthening of the legal system in China, such films may be more effective 
than speeches by the American ambassador about the importance of the rule of law.216 
Washington cannot ignore the promotion of its core values and must take action when its 
values are compromised around the world or else face a decrease in American soft power. 
Washington must accept deserved criticism and rally the world to pay attention to 
significant human rights violations such as the genocide in Darfur. It also means the 
support of developing nations who benefit from entering the World Trade Organization, 
resisting America’s protectionist impulses, and leading by example within the United 
Nations rather than proceeding unilaterally.  
America’s soft power will rise again. When it does, Washington will be able to 
deal with China from a position of greater strength, allowing greater cooperation on joint 
interests and tolerate Beijing’s increasing influence in regions such as Southeast Asia. 
The common interests of Washington and Beijing depend upon China’s ability to employ 
its charm offensive responsibly. Both countries are major energy consumers, desire 
global stability, aim to minimize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
combat major infectious diseases, committed to counter-narcotic operations, desire 
reduction in barriers to free trade, assist developing nations, and perhaps in the long run 
Washington would like China to be more than the world’s factory and assume a larger 
international role in aid, trade, and associated economic issues.  
China is amassing its influence around the world. Beijing’s global reach is real 
and increasing faster than any other country. Its soft power tools have been effective and 
placed China in a position to challenge the United States in many regions of the world. 
Beijing’s public diplomacy, growing aid and trade, culture and language have penetrated 
many societies of the world, yet as the international media focuses on China’s negative 
values and exportation of poor labor, environmental, and governance practices Beijing’s 
soft power is limited. China’s appeal to autocratic regimes poses a serious threat to global 
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stability, its aid policies and noninterference policy is potentially destabilizing, and its 
increase in attractiveness may significantly impact American interests. As America faces 
a decline in its soft power, it will have to reverse course through the promotion of classic 
American values, public diplomacy, and a great culture to prevent the worst-case 
scenario, China using its soft power to push countries to choose between close ties to 
Washington or closer ties to Beijing. In the meantime, Washington must not foolishly 
ignore the gains China is making in the balance of soft power around the world, and seek 
to properly balance its soft and hard power, a sign of a country’s maturity and 
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